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ABSTRACT
In recent years, cloud storage has become an inexpensive and convenient option
for individuals and businesses to store and retrieve information. The cloud releases
the data owner from the financial burden of hiring professionals to create, update
and maintain local databases. The advancements in the field of networking and
the growing need for computing resources for various applications have made cloud
computing more demanding. Its positive aspects make the cloud an attractive option
for data storage, but this service comes with a cost that it requires the data owner
to relinquish control of their information to the cloud service provider. So, there
remains the possibility for malicious insider attacks on the data that may involve
addition, omission, or manipulation of data. This paper presents a novel Integrity
Coded Database (ICDB) approach for ensuring data correctness and freshness in
the cloud. Various options for verifying the integrity of queried data in different
granularities are provided, such as the coarse-grained integrity protection for the
entire returned dataset or a more fine-grained integrity protection down to each tuple
or even each attribute. ICDB allows data owners to insert integrity codes into a
database, outsource the database to the cloud, run queries against the cloud database
server, and verify that the queried information from the cloud is both correct and
fresh. An ICDB prototype has been developed in order to benchmark several ICDB
schemes to evaluate their performance.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Cloud services provide tremendous benefits, since businesses do not need to maintain
an IT department that hires an IT staff and purchases/installs expensive hardware
and software. Among many cloud services, Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) has grown
significantly in the cloud market in recent years. Examples include Amazon Relational
Database Service [13], Microsoft Azure SQL Database [12], Google Cloud SQL [11]
and many others. However, the convenience of outsourcing database management
to the cloud comes with potential privacy and security risks [17]. Different kinds of
attacks can be carried out on the database [10]. Insiders who have access to private
user data (e.g., DBAs and system administrators) could steal, modify, or even destroy
sensitive information. Most notably, data owners subscribed to the cloud service must
trust the service providers and assume the cloud system/database administrators will
not attempt to manipulate their data. Despite the existence of such insider security
threats, current Cloud Database Server (CDS) do not implement any data integrity
protection mechanism to assure customers. Although they have implemented state of
the art technologies to defend against external attacks, there remains the real risk of
attacks from insiders who have privileges to access the stored data. Thus, this insider
security threat is one of the major concerns in developing/growing cloud technologies
2and it needs to be addressed.
While protecting data privacy in the cloud is an important topic, protecting data
integrity is equally important, but often is a more challenging issue [1] since a company
will actually lose the physical control of their data if the company wishes to outsource
their data to the cloud. Without physical control of their data, the company cannot
prevent (but may be able to detect) unauthorized data tampering from malicious
cloud insiders.
1.1.1 Thesis Statement
Since unauthorized data modification in outsourced databases cannot be prevented,
this paper presents an Integrity Coded Database (ICDB) approach, as first seen
in [18], which makes it possible for data owners to detect an insider’s modifications.
Database Integrity
Data integrity protection is to prevent/detect unauthorized data modifications. Once
a database is outsourced, the data owner expects that data item retrieved from
the cloud database should be the original data without unauthorized modification.
If there is no protection mechanism in place, the database service provider (e.g.,
malicious DBA or compromised cloud software) can provide fabricated data without
detection.
By using an ICDB, the data owner is capable of verifying the integrity of their
queried data. The key idea of ICDB is to insert some Integrity Codes (IC) into
the database and these ICs are stored alongside with the data they are protecting.
The ICs are generated by applying a cryptographic function with the data (to be
protected) and the data owner’s secret key as input. A unique serial number is
3assigned to each IC to guarantee the freshness of the data (defined below). When
an ICDB is queried, each data item will be fetched along with its corresponding IC
and serial number. Use of the secret key in the construction of ICs assures that only
the database owner is able to verify the integrity of queried data. To verify data, the
data owner re-computes the IC from the data (with serial number and secret key)
and then comparing it to the IC returned from the query. If either the data or the
IC is forged, the data owner will be able to detect these changes. In order to fully
guarantee data integrity, the returned data should be
• Correct: Returned data should be original, and not forged.
• Fresh: Returned data should be current and not include previously removed
data.
• Complete: All data items satisfying query conditions should be returned.
By upholding all three points above, it is possible to achieve maximal integrity by
detecting the following unauthorized actions:
• Data Manipulation: The alteration of data in the database or in the returned
values.
• Data Omission: Deletion of data in the database or omission of information
in the returned values.
• Data Addition: Insertion of data in the database or addition of information
in the returned values.
• Stale Data: Returning old data or data previously removed from the database.
4Due to the complexity and performance issues incurred while enforcing data
completeness as shown in [2], [3] and [4], our proposed ICDB approach in this study
will only concentrate on ensuring correctness and freshness. This means that the
ICDB models as formulated in this thesis will be only able to fully detect data
manipulation, data addition, and stale data on the fetched query results.
Database Evaluation
Although ICDB is able to detect data alterations, it comes with a cost. An ICDB will
incur memory penalties for storing integrity codes in addition to the original data,
and performance penalties to retrieve extra information (integrity codes) for verifying
the integrity of returned data. To test and benchmark the trade-off between security
and performance penalty, we have implemented an ICDB prototype [16]. This thesis
will focus on answering the following research questions:
• Question 1: Integrity protection. How effective is the introduction of
Integrity Codes to ensure the data correctness and freshness?
• Question 2: Memory Penalty. How much additional memory is required to
store integrity codes?
• Question 3: Performance Penalty. How much additional time is required
for data to be verified after it is queried and/or how much extra information
(i.e., integrity codes) is required to be retrieved from the cloud in every query?
Each of these evaluation metrics will be benchmarked against a pre-populated database.
The database will be converted to an ICDB first, and then it will be tested by several
experiments designed to evaluate its performance. In this thesis, three cryptographic
5algorithms were chosen to generate ICs. They are RSA, CMAC AES, and HMAC
SHA. In addition, we have studied the ICDB in two different integrity protection
granularities, i.e., One integrity Code per Tuple (OCT) or One integrity Code per
Field (OCF), which will be described in section 4.2.
1.1.2 Outline
This thesis is organized into six chapters describing the various aspects of ICDB.
We also share the experimental results and offer suggestions for various real cloud
schemes.
In section 1.1, we discuss concerns about outsourced databases and provide a thesis
statement to address the problem described.
In Chapter 2, we give a literature review on various existing data integrity protection
schemes of outsourced databases.
In Chapter 3, we propose two different models of ICDB and how to evaluate their
performance.
In Chapter 4, we present the construction of Integrity Unit (integrity code and serial
number) and also describe the two different integrity granularity schemes.
In Chapter 5, we present and analyze the experimental results for different combina-
tions of algorithms and granularities for both the ICDB models.
In Chapter 6, we conclude the research and also outline future work that can be done.
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PREVIOUS WORK
In this chapter we discuss some of the research that is directly related to the integrity
protection of outsourced databases. The ongoing research has made use of different
approaches such as signature, hash functions, and encryption. We will review how
these various research approaches are related to this research work.
2.0.1 Integrity Coded Databases (ICDB)–Protecting Integrity for Out-
sourced Databases
Nanjundarao’s work [18] (2015) defined the processes for which ICDBs can be created
and queried. Her thesis outlined and provided preliminary results for an ICDB model
using RSA to generate one integrity code per data field.
My thesis is a continuation of Nanjundarao’s work. My research provides addi-
tional ICDB configurations and enhancements to improve performance. In addition
to using RSA signatures, this thesis details performance results for using AES and
SHA as the underlying integrity-code-generating function, along with performance
differences for different integrity granularity protection, i.e., generating integrity codes
per field, or per tuple. We also introduce an innovative technique ”aggregate integrity
code verification” in the ICDB model to significantly enhance its performance.
72.0.2 Securing Storage in Public Cloud Infrastructure
Haxhijaha et al. (2014) in their research [25] focused on verifying the integrity of
the outsourced data by the client themselves, rather than depending upon some third
party auditor. Their paper attempts to point out advantages and security concerns
of cloud computing and focuses on avoiding third party auditors. For this, hash
values of files are computed at the customer’s side to avoid the need for third party
auditors. The hash values are then stored at a secure local hash repository. The client
can request the data file from the cloud at any time and regenerate the hash for the
file. The regenerated hash value can be matched against the precomputed and stored
hash values for verification. Unlike ICDB, the technique proposed in their paper is
targeted for the file system and not for databases. The MD5 hash algorithm is used
as cryptographic algorithm. The MD5 is reported with various attacks [36]. The
hash values are stored at the client machine, which incurs extra storage cost to the
client. In their study, unfortunately no experimental results regarding performance
overhead are provided.
In 2004, researchers [19] outlined an implementation for ensuring data complete-
ness in relational databases. Although not explicitly stated, the model offers correct-
ness and completeness guarantees by providing a signature per tuple for correctness,
along with a separate table signature for completeness. Tuple signatures, referred to
as Record Integrity Codes (RICs), are generated using keyed hashes. In addition to
RICs, the paper offers an incremental signature scheme using XOR MACs [20]. With
this they are able to provide a table-level signature that requires computation based
on the number of updates on the data (and not the size of the table). This table
signature is able to detect additions and deletions of tuples in the database, thereby
8ensuring completeness for each table.
Much like RICs, integrity codes in ICDB offer correctness by generating a keyed
signature. The major difference is that integrity codes in ICDB, in addition to
signatures, also have a serial component attached to them to maintain freshness.
Unlike RICs, integrity codes in ICDB can also be generated per field.
2.0.3 Freshness Guarantee for an Outsourced Database
A 2008 paper [3] focused on providing freshness guarantees for outsourced databases
provided two approaches for freshness, using timestamps or using a probabilistic
method. The first approach with timestamps sets an expiration time for each sig-
nature, and the signature must be updated when it is expired. This approach works
under an assumption that the local time is always correct. The second approach
defines operations, known as audits, which occasionally perform fake updates. Audits
can insert new fake tuples and delete old ones from the outsourced database, checking
that the new fake tuples always show up in query results. If any deleted fake tuple
show up in the query result, the old data attack can be detected.
Another research work [14] tried a similar approach by inserting fake data. They
require a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for performing verification, where the data
owner hands the check sum to the TTP. The search request contains two parts: the
real search request and the verification one. For the real one the user can receive
the expected results but for the verification one a check value sum′ generated by the
service provider should be provided. The user can then compare the sum and sum′
to check for freshness and completeness.
ICDB’s freshness guarantee differs from both the timestamp and probabilistic
methods. The timestamp method requires constant updates to expired timestamps,
9while the probabilistic method is not completely secure, and both methods require
periodical operations (timestamp updates and audits) which contribute noticeable
system overhead. ICDBs use serial numbers, which can be cross-checked with a
compact list of invalid serial numbers without extra operations. This significantly
reduces system overhead to guarantee freshness, since the serial number only needs
to be updated when the data is updated.
2.0.4 Authentication of Outsourced Databases using Signature Aggrega-
tion and Chaining
A paper detailing another authenticated database system [4] (2006), provides a similar
approach to our ICDB implementation and addresses the integrity of query replies
in the outsourced databases. The approach, called Digital Signature Aggregation
and Chaining (DSAC), is used along with digital signatures at the granularity of
individual tuples. Each individual signature is constructed by a hash value of the
tuple combined with the hash value of its preceding tuple in each searchable attribute,
signed with a secret key. This construction helps to achieve completeness by a
secure linking of tuple-level signatures to form a so-called signature chain. The
verification object includes sets of matching tuples for the query, sets of immediate
predecessor and successor nodes of the first and last nodes respectively along the
search dimension, a unified signature rather than individual signatures, and hashes
of immediate predecessor tuples along all other searchable dimensions.
Like ICDBs, they provided results for signing each tuple in the database for
correctness. The key difference is that their approach provides completeness with
signature chaining, but no freshness guarantees are provided. Also, the paper is solely
focused on the completeness problem for range queries. This requires the tuples to
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be sorted in ascending order prior to the signature computation. This adds extra
computational overhead to both the database server(cloud) and the client.
2.0.5 Integrity Protection using Authenticated Data Structure-based Tech-
niques
Niaz and Saake in their work [5] focused on Merkle Hash Tree–based data integrity
techniques. Merkle Hash Tree is a Signature Scheme based on a binary tree of hashes.
Each leaf node holds the hash of a data block. To verify the integrity of any data
block, a signer transmits the hashes of only those nodes which are involved in the
authentication path of the data block under consideration. With those hashes, the
client can compute the hash of the root node and then match it against the stored
root hash. For example, for the merkle hash tree in Figure 2.1, if the receiver needs
to verify the integrity of data block 2 then only H(1), H(3,4) and H(5,8) need to
be transfered to the receiver. With these hashes, the receiver can compute the root
hash H(1,8) and then compare it against the stored root hash. Two models have
been implemented: Single Authentication Table (SAT), which is one table with all
of the authentication data and Level Based Authentication Table (LBAT), where
authentication data for each level of an MHT is stored in an individual table.
Though the integrity is protected, the structure of the relational database is
changed. In addition, it requires the server side to trace the involved nodes in the
authentication path and thus adding performance overhead. The ICDB model is more
transparent to the database server without the need to change the database structure
or to trace the authentication path.
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Figure 2.1: Merkle Hash Tree
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CHAPTER 3
ICDB MODELS
In this thesis, we propose two ICDB models: (1) the Basic ICDB model and (2) Dual
Mode Verification (DMV) model. The DMV model is built on top of the basic model
and verifies query results in aggregation.
3.1 Basic ICDB Model
There are two components in the basic ICDB model: the ICDB client and the Cloud
Database Server (CDS) as shown is figure 3.1. The Cloud Service Provider uses
a Cloud Database Server for data storage and various database–related operations.
The ICDB client and the Cloud Service Provider are connected via the Internet. The
ICDB client (on behalf of the data owner) seeks to outsource their data to the CDS,
but would like to keep the capability of detecting unauthorized changes to their data.
Hereafter, we will use the term ”ICDB client” instead of data owner, knowing that
the ICDB client is a software client conducting ICDB operations on behalf of the data
owner.
The ICDB client has five different modules responsible for central management,
DB conversion, query conversion, verification and user interface display respectively.
The ICDB Manager is responsible for managing the other four modules by provid-
ing input and receiving output for each module, forwarding data between modules,
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Figure 3.1: A diagram illustrating the interactions between ICDB client and cloud
DB Service Provider
connecting with the Cloud Service Provider via the Internet, and displaying results
on the user interface. The ICDB database instance is created and outsourced to the
cloud as shown in Steps 1 and 2 in figure 3.1. The ICDB manager, upon receiving
a SQL query request from the user, will forward the SQL query to the ICDB query
conversion module to convert the SQL query to an ICDB query which will then be
forwarded to the CDS as shown in Steps 3 and 4. The CDS returns the query result
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along with serial numbers and Integrity Codes to the ICDB manager and the ICDB
manager forwards the query result to the verification module in Step 5. Finally, the
results of integrity verification are presented to the user in Step 6.
The model in figure 3.1 is designed with the goal that employing the proposed
ICDB technology will be transparent to the cloud service provider. The ICDB client
can convert an existing database to an ICDB instance without the need to redesign
existing database systems (e.g., MySQL, PostgreSQL). The CDS does not have to
treat any ICDB instance differently from a standard database.
The ICDB client is responsible for the following actions:
1. Converting a database to an ICDB instance by inserting Integrity Codes (ICs)
into the database before outsourcing it to the service provider:
An Integrity Code (IC) is a cryptographic code used for the integrity verification
for a data item (either an attribute or a tuple). The code is constructed by
applying a cryptographic function with inputs such as the data itself, the secret
key of the data owner, and a unique ’Serial Number’. Each IC is generated
to protect either an attribute data or the entire tuple in a table based on the
level of protection granularity. For example, in the Table 3.1 below, the column
’IC’ represents the Integrity Code of the entire tuple along with a unique serial
number associated with the IC. In the case of attribute level integrity protection,
each attribute will have an IC column and a serial number column associated
with it.
Table 3.1: An example of an ICDB table with tuple-level integrity protection
dept no dept name IC serial
d001 Marketing IC(d001,Marketing,1135980685) 1135980685
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2. Upon receiving a SQL query, converting it to an ICDB query:
In addition to the requested data, the ICDB query should also retrieve corre-
sponding ICs and serials related to the data so that the ICDB client is able to
verify the integrity of requested data. In the example of Table 3.1, a SQL query
to retrieve department number is written: {Select dept name From departments
where dept no=’d001’;} The converted ICDB query for the given SQL query
would be: {Select dept no, dept name, IC, serial number from departments
where dept no=’d001’;} See below for why the ICDB query needs to retrieve
extra data for the integrity verification.
3. Verifying the integrity of queried data to ensure correctness and freshness:
After the data is fetched along with the corresponding IC and serial number,
verification is done by the ICDB client recomputing the IC to compare with the
IC fetched from the ICDB query. Regeneration of the IC requires the dept no,
the dept name, the IC and the serial number.
3.2 Dual Mode Verification (DMV) Model
Comparing with the data to be protected, integrity code size could be relatively
larger. Fetching these larger size integrity codes along with queried data is a notable
overhead in the network. To reduce this network overhead, we propose an innovative
Dual Mode Verification (DMV) model. In addition to the ICDB client running in the
data owner’s machine, this model requires an ICDB cloud application to be running in
the cloud service provider. This is easily done through Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
[31] [32] in cloud computing. The DMV model provides an option to verify the fetched
data in:
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1. Aggregate Verification (AV) mode: verify the integrity of all fetched data
as a whole, and/or
2. Detailed Verification (DV) mode: verify the integrity of each fetched tuple
or attribute in a finer granularity.
The DMV model shown in figure 3.2 is designed to reduce network overhead if the
ICDB client chooses to perform data integrity verification using the AV mode only.
If the AV mode verification fails, it means some data is corrupted within the fetched
dataset. In this case, the ICDB client can either discard the entire dataset or can
choose to perform the DV mode verification to figure out which data items (attributes
or tuples) in the fetched dataset are actually corrupted. This means integrity codes
will be fetched only in the DV mode if the aggregate verification fails.
The DMV architecture consists of three components: the ICDB Client, the
Cloud Database Server (CDS) and the ICDB Cloud Application (CA). The
DMV model has an extra component, the ICDB cloud application, for aggregate
verification in addition to those components in the basic ICDB model. The ICDB
cloud application is responsible for generating an Aggregate Integrity Code (AIC)
for the entire dataset fetched in the AV mode. AIC is a single integrity code that is
generated by aggregating all the ICs of all fetched data. Depending on the encryption
algorithm used, we will need to use a different approach to generate the AIC. The
algorithms and techniques used for generating ICDB integrity codes and AIC will be
described in detail in sections 4.2 and 4.4. In aggregate verification mode, the ICDB
client only needs to fetch one integrity code (AIC) along with the query result, rather
than an integrity code for each data item in the query result. Current cloud service
providers have 64-bit maximum size limit [15] for a BigInteger variable in the cloud
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database server. This restricts the computation of AIC in the cloud database server
and thus the DMV model requires a separate cloud software application for AIC
generation. We call this software the ICDB cloud application or the AIC generator.
Because the DMV model is built on top of the basic ICDB model, the module for
converting the database to an ICDB instance and outsourcing it remains the same
as that shown in steps 1 and 2 in figure 3.2. Similar to the Basic model, the ICDB
manager in the DMV model is responsible for forwarding an SQL query to the ICDB
query conversion module based on the level of protection granularity as depicted in
Step 3. The difference is that the DMV model converts an SQL query to two ICDB
queries Q1 and Q2 in step 4. Q1 is sent to the cloud database server to fetch the
SQL query result (data along with associated serial numbers), and Q2 is sent to the
ICDB cloud application to delegate the ICDB cloud application to fetch all the ICs
corresponding to the data retrieved by Q1. The ICDB cloud application, on receiving
Q2, forwards it to the CDS to fetch all the ICs as described in Steps 5 and 6. The
ICDB cloud application then generates and sends the AIC to the ICDB client as shown
in Step 7. In this step, the AIC is generated from ICs (not from data). For aggregate
verification, the ICDB client has to regenerate the aggregate integrity code from data
(not from ICs), using the ICDB Q1 result that includes data and the serials fetched
from the CDS in Step 8. The details of AIC generation and regeneration by the cloud
application and by the ICDB client respectively will be described in detail in section
4.4. The AIC regenerated by the ICDB client is then matched with that returned by
the ICDB cloud application for aggregate verification. If aggregate verification fails,
the ICDB client provides an option for DV. If aggregate verification succeeds, the
ICDB manager presents verified data to the user through the User Interface Display.
Since DV is optional, if the user chooses to not perform detailed verification, the
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entire dataset will be discarded and a message of a failed aggregate verification will
notify the user as shown in Step 10. On the other hand, if the user chooses to perform
detailed verification, all the ICs for all the data items (fetched earlier by Q1) have to
be fetched using ICDB Q2 as shown in Steps 11 and 12. Upon receiving the ICs from
the CDS, the ICDB manager will forward the results of both ICDB Q1 and Q2 to the
detailed verification module as in Step 13. Finally, the result of detailed verification
will present each individual corrupted data item to the user as shown in Step 14. DV
can detect either particular tuples or attribute values have been altered, depending
on the level of protection granularity. Since the integrity code construction in the
DMV model is same as that of the basic ICDB model, the ICDB instances in the
DMV model are no different than those in the basic ICDB model.
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Figure 3.2: An Architecture for Dual Mode Verification (DMV) model (built on the
top of the basic ICDB model)
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CHAPTER 4
ICDB CONSTRUCTION
4.1 Definition of Variables
In this section, we will define some variables.
• d: A data item to be protected. In this thesis, it could be a field entry (an
attribute value) or an entire tuple. In ICDB, each data item d will have an
Integrity Code (IC) to ensure its integrity.
• D = {d1, d2, . . . , dr}: A dataset (a set of data item di’s) returned by an SQL
query, where r is a non-negative integer.
• ICSet = {IC1, IC2, . . . , ICr}: The set of corresponding integrity codes to the
dataset D. Each ICi is the integrity code for each data item di.
• s: Each integrity code IC has a unique serial number s. The construction of
ICs ensures that s is an unforgeable identity of that IC.
• S = {s1, s2, . . . , sr}: The set of corresponding serial numbers to the ICSet and
thus to the dataset D. That is, each si ∈ S is the corresponding serial number
to each ICi ∈ ICSet and thus to each di ∈ D.
• m: A collection of information related to d, including d itself and a unique serial
number s, that are used to construct the integrity code for the data item d.
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• M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mr}: A set of mi’s, returned by an ICDB query (converted
from an SQL query) so that the ICDB client has enough information to re-
generate the ICs.
4.2 Integrity Codes
In the ICDB model, we protect data integrity by assuring their correctness and
freshness. To accomplish this, our approach is to insert an integrity code along with
a serial number into the database for each data item to be protected. By checking
the integrity code to see whether it matches with the data to be protected, we are
able to ensure the data’s correctness since the integrity code is constructed using a
secret key known only by the data owner. Nobody, except the data owner, is able to
modify the data and generate a matching integrity code for it. By checking the serial
number, we are able to ensure the data’s freshness since the serial numbers for all
removed data will be marked as invalid (not fresh) in the data owner’s record. The
approach we use to track valid serial numbers is similar to that of the X.509 standard
on maintaining the validity of public key certificates.
Given a data item d and a secret key k (known only to the data owner), the
Integrity Code IC(d) of data d is constructed using an IC generating function G(m, k)
:
IC(d) = G(m, k) (4.1)
where m is a collection of information related to d as described in Section 4.1. In
each level of integrity protection granularity, m contains a different collection of
information. In OCF (One Code Per Field) granularity, m is formed by concatenating
the following information:
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m = T.A(e) + D + T.K(e) + A + T + s = d + D + T.K(e) + A + T + s (4.2)
where T is a table name, A is an attribute (field) name, s is a unique serial number
assigned to the code, + means concatenation, T.A(e) = d is the attribute A’s value
of an entity e in table T , a delimiter D for prohibiting the replacement attack as
described in Section 5.2.2, T.K(e) is the primary key value of the same entity e (i.e.,
the primary key in the same tuple as T.A(e) is located). In OCT (One Code per
Tuple) granularity, m is organized as:
m = T.A1(e) + D + T.A2(e) + . . . + T.An(e) + T + s = d + T + s (4.3)
where T is a table name, s is the unique serial number, + means concatenation, and
T.A1(e), . . . , T.An(e) are the field values in a tuple (or in other words, the attribute
A1’s, A2’s, . . ., An’s values for an entity e, respectively) and D is a delimiter in between
each field value for prohibiting the replacement attack as described in Section 5.2.2.
In OCT the data item to be protected is the entire tuple, i.e., d = T.A1(e)+T.A2(e)+
. . . + T.An(e).
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 will describe in detail why m should contain a different
collection of information in OCF and OCT. Equation 4.1 above shows an integrity
code’s construction, where the function G can be one of three different cryptographic
algorithms which will be described later. On top of the integrity code, let’s define an
integrity unit for a data item d as a pair of < IC(d), s >, i.e., an integrity unit is an
integrity code and the corresponding serial number (in clear).
The following sections describe the three different cryptographic algorithms used
to generate the integrity code in this thesis, and the management of serial numbers.
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4.2.1 Integrity Code Generating Algorithms
To maintain correctness, an IC must be cryptographically strong against forgery.
With this in mind, we chose to use three different cryptographic algorithms to generate
the integrity code: RSA, CMAC AES, and HMAC SHA [24], [7], [4], [34] [35].
In the literature, both CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) and
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) algorithms have been designed
with the objective that anyone without the secret key is unable to produce a valid
(matching) MAC. A matching MAC to a data item means that anyone with the
knowledge of the secret key can verify the validity of the MAC which in turn proves
the integrity of the data item. In this project, we chose to use CMAC AES and HMAC
SHA provided by the BouncyCastle Java library [22] to generate integrity codes in
our experiments. Compared to RSA, these MAC algorithms have the advantages
of smaller-size integrity codes and more efficient code generation. Despite RSA’s
large memory and performance footprint, we have included RSA in our experiments
because its homomorphic property [23] is useful in aggregate verification and also as
a comparison to other notable publications involving the use of RSA [24], [7] and [4].
RSA
RSA has been used widely in many public-key cryptosystems. The public key is used
for the encryption (or signature verification) while the private key is used to decrypt
the encrypted data (or generate a signature). If y is an RSA private key and (N, x)
is the public key, for a message m (or a collection of information related to a data
item d as described in Equations 4.2 or 4.3), the signature Sig(m) can be used as the
integrity code to protect the data item d:
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Sig(m) = my mod N (4.4)
The signature Sig(m) can be verified by checking:
m
?
= Sig(m)x mod N (4.5)
The homomorphic property allows the operations to be made on the ciphers without
the need of decryption [30]. RSA has the multiplicative homomorphic property which
allows multiplication operations to be made on the integrity code (signature). The
result of these operations is equal to the integrity code of the product of the messages
(or data) as shown in the the equations below:
Sig(m1) = m
y
1 mod N (4.6)
Sig(m2) = m
y
2 mod N (4.7)
Sig(m1) ∗ Sig(m2) = (m1 ∗m2)y mod N = Sig(m1 ∗m2) (4.8)
This RSA homomorphic property [23] allows the ICDB cloud application in our
ICDB model to generate a single Aggregate Integrity Code (AIC) from many indi-
vidual ICs (which will be described in section 4.4), which can reduce the integrity
verification process’s computational complexity in the ICDB client. Furthermore,
checking the integrity of a queried dataset as a whole in the AV mode, the ICDB
client only requires one AIC, rather than requiring all individual ICs for all data
items in the dataset, thus greatly reducing the network load.
There are other public key algorithms such as Elgamal and Paillier [8] [9], which
also have the homomorphic property. We chose RSA partially because the research
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work in [33] have found that RSA takes less time for encryption and decryption
compared to Elgamal and Paillier, though RSA’s key generation may take a longer
time. We use RSA in this research only for integrity code generation/verification and
not for the purpose of protecting confidentiality. The time to generate keys is not
an issue since the data owner (ICDB client) will not share his/her RSA keys (both
public and private keys) with anyone: neither the cloud server nor the ICDB cloud
application. Thus, the keys can be generated offline. The data owner uses the private
key to generate integrity codes (signatures) and uses the public key to verify the
integrity codes along with data returned from clouds. The only value shared with the
cloud server and the ICDB cloud application is the RSA modulus N , which will be
used in modular multiplication of multiple ICs to generate one Aggregate Integrity
Code (AIC). Because the public key is not shared with anyone, the known attacks
on unpadded RSA are not possible. The use of unique serial number means that all
data items (even with the same value) have a unique integrity code.
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
One type of MAC suited for generating integrity code is a CMAC, using AES-128 [6]
as its backing cipher. CMAC is a technique for constructing a Message Authentication
Code from a block cipher much like CBC-MAC [34]. It provides assurance of both
the authentication and integrity. CMAC is a variation of CBC-MAC and fixes the
security vulnerabilities such as the variable-length attack in CBC-MAC. An attacker
who knows the correct message-tag in CBC-MAC pairs for two messages (m, t) and
(m′, t′) can generate a third message m′′ whose CBC-MAC will also be t′. These
security issues are fixed in CMAC and hence we chose it as one of our integrity code
generating algorithms.
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Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
The second MAC algorithm we chose to use is HMAC, using SHA-128 as its digest.
HMAC is a message authentication code that uses a cryptographic hash and a secret
key. So HMAC can simultaneously verify both integrity and authentication. Hash
functions are used in various prior works [25] for integrity protection. Hash algorithms
such as SHA-1 and MD5 have been attacked in various ways [36]. One way is with
length extension attacks where the attacker uses Hash(m1) and length of m1 to gen-
erate Hash(m1||m2). Since HMAC doesn’t use the construction Hash(key||message),
HMAC is not subject to length extension attacks [35]. The cryptographic strength of
HMAC depends on the properties of underlying hash function. The construction of
HMAC is described as:
HMAC(k,m) = H((k′ ⊕ opad) + H((k′ ⊕ ipad) + m)) (4.9)
Where, H is a cryptographic hash function, k is the secret key, m is the message, k′
is a secret key derived from the original key k , + denotes concatenation, ⊕ denotes
exclusive or (XOR), opad is the outer padding and ipad is the inner padding
4.2.2 Serial Number Construction
In addition to the integrity code, a unique serial number is generated and stored
along with the IC to ensure the freshness of the protected data. The data owner
must keep an Integrity Code Revocation List (ICRL) locally, which contains those
serial numbers that are revoked/invalid. When the data owner removes or updates
a piece of data, the serial number corresponding to the data (and thus the integrity
code) should be listed or marked as revoked/invalid in the ICRL file. Thus, if a
27
query were to return a data entry with a verifiable integrity code but with a serial
number marked as revoked, the returned data is not fresh even though it is correct
(not forged). The data owner will be able to detect invalid serial numbers for the
data returned from the cloud by simply looking up the local ICRL file.
In case the list of revoked serial numbers grows, ICRL size can be reduced by
applying the same technique used in the X.509 standard (this standard is used
in keeping the size of the public key certificate revocation list small). Using this
technique, ICDB maintains first valid serial number Sf . All the serial numbers less
than Sf are invalid. Here are the steps to reduce the size of the ICRL:
• Select a new first valid serial number S ′f
• All valid integrity codes in the ICDB whose serial number is less than S ′f need
to be renewed.
• Fetch the corresponding data and ICs for those serials to be renewed. Regen-
erate ICs with new serials (greater than S ′f ).
• The updated ICRL now contains only those revoked serial numbers greater than
or equal to S ′f , listed in an ascending order. Those revoked serial numbers less
than S ′f will be no longer kept in the list, and thus the ICRL size is reduced.
4.3 Granularity Schemes
We have studied and experimentally bench-marked two different granularity levels
of integrity protection, henceforth referred to as a Granularity Scheme. These two
schemes are One Code per Field (OCF) and One Code per Tuple (OCT). Both
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schemes specify how data will be grouped together to construct the integrity code
so that the correctness and freshness of the data can be guaranteed.
4.3.1 One Code per Field (OCF)
The OCF scheme specifies that for every field (attribute) data, there must exist a
corresponding Integrity Code (IC). In other words, for every field containing user
data in a table, there must exist a field to store the corresponding ICs. Furthermore,
another field is also required to store the corresponding serial numbers. Table 4.1
below illustrates this ICDB OCF scheme:
Table 4.1: An example table for OCF granularity
dept no dept name dept no ic dept no serial dept name ic dept name serial
d001 Marketing IC(d001) 1135980686 IC(Marketing) 1135980687
d002 Finance IC(d002) 1135980682 IC(Finance) 1135980683
Here, the OCF integrity code ICOCF (d) for a user data d is defined by the following
IC generating function:
ICOCF (d) = G(m, k) = G(T.A(e) + D + T.K(e) + A + T + s, k) (4.10)
where the symbol + means concatenation and m is a collection of information related
to the user data d, including the data d = T.A(e) itself (a field A’s value of an entity
e in table T ), a delimiter D for prohibiting the replacement attack as described in
5.2.2, primary key value T.K(e) of the same entity e (i.e., the key value in the same
tuple where T.A(e) is located), the name of the field A, the name of the table T , a
unique serial number s assigned to the code. G(m, k) is the IC generating function
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using the data owner’s secret key k. We use different information related to d in the
collection m for preventing/detecting various attacks described in section 5.2. Each of
the entity values is tied with their corresponding Primary Key value. This releases us
from the burden of generating ICs for all the combinations of attributes in the table.
For example, a Database University may contain a Table student with attributes
FirstName, LastName, SSN, StudentNumber, Sex, Birthdate, Class, Degree and
Address. The query fetching the values for attributes FirstName and Address would
require the IC to be generated by combining the same two attributes; this is also true
for all other combinations of attributes. The use of the primary key value T.K(e)
along with each of the attribute values/data T.A(e) for generating the Integrity Code
helps in tying each of the attributes with their respective Primary Keys - which in
turn ties them with each other. This helps us get rid of multiple ICs to be generated
based on the different combination of attributes. In addition, the use of attribute
name A along with the data d, detects a substitution attack in the particular table
since different data items with the same values cannot be related to the same Primary
Key value and to the same attribute name. However, the attack may not be detected
if another table in the same database contains the same attribute name with same
data value and primary key value. To ensure the detection of a substitution attack
in such cases, we use the table name T in the collection m, since a database cannot
have multiple tables with the same name.
This scheme allows for fine-grained integrity protection down-to each individual
field. If a field’s data does not match its integrity code, the data owner knows that
this field entry is invalid. In order for the ICDB client (on behalf on the data owner)
to verify the integrity of the returned data, the query to be issued by the ICDB client
to the cloud database server needs to request information in addition to the data
30
itself such including the corresponding integrity codes, key values, serial numbers,
etc. Thus, the ICDB client needs to convert an original SQL query to an ICDB query
to retrieve enough information for integrity verification.
OCF Query Conversion in the ICDB Basic Model
In the ICDB Basic model, there are only two entities: the CDS and the ICDB client.
Once the ICs are generated and inserted into the database, the ICDB client
is responsible for converting any SQL query [26] to an ICDB query. The query
conversion can be explained as the Algorithm A below:
Algorithm A: OCF-Basic Query Conversion.
Input (an SQL query):
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
Output (an OCF-Basic query):
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar, K1, K2, . . . Km, B1, B2, . . . Bk,
IC(A1), IC(A2), . . . IC(Ar), S(A1), S(A2), . . . S(Ar),
IC(k1), IC(k2), . . . IC(km), S(k1), S(k2), . . . S(km),
IC(B1), IC(B2) . . . IC(Bk), S(B1), S(B2), . . . S(Bk)
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
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where A1 . . . Ar are attribute names, K1 . . . Km are key attribute names for tables
T1 . . . Tm respectively, B1 . . . Bk are attribute names that appear in the conditions
C1 . . . Cn within the WHERE clause. In order to verify the integrity of these attribute
values listed above, we also need to retrieve the associated Integrity Unit (IC and serial
number), one for each of these attributes A1 . . . Ar, K1 . . . Km , B1 . . . Bk respectively.
We use example SQL queries Query 1 and Query 2 over an ’Employees’ database
to demonstrate how to apply the above query conversion algorithm, where Query 1 is
a selection query from a single table and Query 2 is a query with a join operation from
multiple tables. The ’Employees’ database chosen is a MySQL sample database pub-
licly available online: Employees (v1.0.6) [21]. It has a total of six tables and consists
of 4 million records. These six tables are departments, dept emp, dept manager,
employees, salaries and titles, of which the table salaries is the largest. The
database schema is provided in Appendix A.
Query 1 - Retrieve the salary of employees whose employee number is
1001:
The original SQL query for Query 1 is
SELECT salary FROM salaries WHERE emp no = 1001;
Applying the query conversion Algorithm A, the converted OCF-Basic query is:
SELECT salary, emp no, from date
salary IC, salary serial, emp no IC, emp no serial,
from date IC, from date serial
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FROM salaries
WHERE emp no = 1001;
The resulting ICDB query, in addition to ’salary’ attribute, also selects ’emp no’
and ’from date’ attributes along with their integrity unit (IC and serial). This is
because these additional attributes are the primary key for the ’salaries’ table, and
is required for the integrity verification process. All the example queries discussed
in the following sections will follow the same pattern of fetching additional related
information to the data based on the query conversion Algorithm A described earlier.
In addition to a selection query from a single table, Algorithm A also describes
how to convert a join query from multiple tables. We use the Query 2 below to
demonstrate the conversion:
Query 2 - For each employee, retrieve the department name in which they
are working and the start and end dates of their time working there.
The original SQL join query for Query 2 is:
SELECT departments.dept name, dept emp.from date, dept emp.to date
FROM departments, dept emp
WHERE departments.dept no = dept emp.dept no AND
departments.dept no = ’d002’;
The converted OCF-Basic query for Query 2 is:
SELECT departments.dept name, dept emp.from date, dept emp.to date,
departments.dept no, dept emp.emp no,
IC(departments.dept name), S(departments.dept name),
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IC(dept emp.from date), S(dept emp.from date),
IC(dept emp.to date), S(dept emp.to date),
IC(departments.dept no), S(departments.dept no)
IC(dept emp.emp no), S(dept emp.emp no)
FROM departments, dept emp
WHERE departments.dept no = dept emp.dept no AND
departments.dept no = ’d002’;
In addition to selection and join queries, the ICDB was also designed to handle
SQL functional queries. For any aggregate operation (sum, min, max, average, count),
all the data used to determine the result of an aggregate function has to be fetched
back to the ICDB client so that the ICDB client is able to perform the aggregate
operation over these fetched data on behalf of the data owner. ICDB was designed
in this way because in the ICDB models the cloud database server is not trustworthy
to directly perform all the SQL queries, including the aggregate queries. Thus, the
ICDB client will need to convert the original SQL aggregate query to an OCF query
so that all the required data can be fetched to calculate the aggregate value. Consider
an example SQL functional Query 3 below.
Query 3 - calculates the sum of all the salaries in the ’salaries’ table:
The original SQL aggregate functional query for Query 3 is:
Select sum (salary) from salaries;
The converted OCF-Basic query for Query 3 is:
34
SELECT salary, emp no, from date
salary IC, salary serial, emp no IC, emp no serial,
from date IC, from date serial
FROM salaries;
After all the fetched data are verified, the ICDB client can then perform the
aggregate (sum) operation, i.e., all the salary data are summed. For other SQL
functional queries, the query conversion and aggregate value generation processes are
exactly the same as we described in this example.
OCF Query Conversion in the ICDB DMV Model (OCF-DMV)
In the ICDB Dual Mode Verification (DMV) model, there are three entities: the cloud
database server, the ICDB cloud application, and the ICDB Client.
DMV model makes use of two different cloud services i.e, the cloud database
server and the ICDB cloud application. So, each SQL query needs to be converted
to separate ICDB queries for CDS and CA so that both of them can accomplish
their respective tasks. The ICDB cloud application requires only the IC’s to generate
an Aggregate Integrity Code (AIC). The ICDB client needs to fetch from the cloud
database server all the data along with the serials to regenerate IC’s. The ICDB
client also needs to fetch the AIC from the cloud application to verify the regenerated
IC’s and thus verify the user data.
The DMV model has two modes (aggregate verification or detailed verification).
Different queries need to be executed in different entities in different modes.
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OCF Query Conversion in Aggregate Verification Mode: In an aggregate
verification mode, the ICDB client has to issue a query to the cloud database server
to fetch data along with the corresponding serial numbers (but not the IC’s). The
ICDB client simultaneously has to issue another query to the ICDB cloud application
to request the AIC of the corresponding IC’s.
The query to be issued to the cloud database server would be similar to the
Algorithm A by excluding the Integrity Codes, whereas the query to be issued to the
ICDB cloud application would be again similar to the Algorithm A but only retrieving
the IC’s. Algorithm B below describes this query conversion.
Algorithm B: OCF-DMV Query Conversion.
Input (an SQL query):
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
Output (an OCF-DMV query Q1 to the cloud database server and an OCF-
DMV query Q2 to the ICDB cloud application):
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OCF-DMV query Q1: to be issued to the cloud database server.
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar, K1, K2, . . . Km, B1, B2, . . . Bk,
S(A1), S(A2), . . . S(Ar),
S(k1), S(k2), . . . S(km),
S(B1), S(B2), . . . S(Bk)
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
OCF-DMV query Q2: to be issued to the ICDB cloud application.
SELECT IC(A1), IC(A2), . . . IC(Ar), IC(k1), IC(k2), . . . IC(km),
IC(B1), IC(B2) . . . IC(Bk)
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn;
Upon receiving OCF-DMV query Q1, the cloud database server will return the
requested data and the corresponding serials to the ICDB client. However, when the
ICDB cloud application receives OCF-DMV query Q2, it will forward the query to
the database server to retrieve all the ICs so that it can generate the AIC. Finally,
the ICDB cloud application will forward the single AIC to the ICDB client. After
receiving the AIC and all the data and serials (from Q1), the ICDB client is able to
check the data integrity by performing an aggregate verification. The AIC generation
in the ICDB cloud application and the aggregate verification process in the ICDB
client will be described later in Section 4.4.
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OCF Query Conversion in Detailed Verification Mode: When aggregate
verification fails, it means there is something wrong in the returned dataset as a
whole. The ICDB client can either discard the entire dataset since it is incorrect, or
the ICDB client can choose the option to verify the data in detail to identify which
particular data’s integrity has been compromised. In case the ICDB decides not to
take the detailed verification option, there is no need to download all the IC’s from the
cloud and thus reduce the network overhead. If the ICDB client chooses to perform
detailed verification, then it has to issue the query Q2 again to the cloud database
server to fetch all the individual IC’s, which is in fact the same query issued to the
cloud application in the aggregate verification mode.
4.3.2 One Code per Tuple (OCT)
When bench marking the performance of the OCF schemes, results have indicated
that the average ratio between an Integrity Code size and its corresponding data
field size is high (see experimental results). The storage usage is inefficient since each
data field usually holds only a small amount of data, but it needs to have a much
larger size of storage to store the corresponding IC. For example, a tuple with an
attribute First Name can contain the data, George, which is only 6 characters (48
bits) compared to an Integrity Code (IC) which are usually recommended to have a
minimum of 128 bits (using MAC algorithms) or at least 1028 bits (using the RSA
algorithm) to be safe from forgery.
To make the storage usage more efficient, instead of one code per field (OCF), we
can generate only one code per tuple (OCT). A tuple usually contains multiple fields,
and therefore in many cases, the data size (entire tuple) is more than the 128-bit
integrity code size (if using MAC algorithms).
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To generate an integrity code for an entire tuple, all the data in the tuple can be
concatenated before passing it to the IC-generating function, as shown in the example
table 4.2.
Table 4.2: An example table for OCT granularity
dept no dept name IC serial
d001 Marketing IC(d001,Marketing,1135980685) 1135980685
d002 Finance IC(d002,Finance,1135980689) 1135980689
IC unit is an ordered pair consisting of an IC and serial number, where the IC in
OCT schemes is defined by the following IC-generating function:
ICOCT (d) = G(m, k) = G(T.A1(e)+D+T.A2(e)+. . .+T.An(e)+T+s, k) = G(d+T+s, k)
(4.11)
where the symbol + means concatenation. T.A1(e), . . . , T.An(e) are the field values
in a tuple (or in other words, attributes values for an entity e), D is a delimiter in
between each field values for prohibiting the replacement attack as described in 5.2.2,
and in OCT the data item to be protected is d = T.A1(e) + T.A2(e) + . . . + T.An(e)
(i.e., the entire tuple). The information collection m = d+ T + s represents the data
item d along with the table name T and a unique serial number s assigned to the code.
The purpose of including additional information related to the data item (tuple) d in
the collection m is to ensure the uniqueness of m and also to prevent/detect various
attacks described in section 5.2. Although each tuple in a table T is unique within the
same table due to the Primary Key constraint in the SQL standard, another table T ′
in the same database could have the exactly same tuple values, i.e., a tuple in table T ′
with different attributes but with the same values, compared to the tuple in table T .
So, including table name T in the IC construction helps in detecting a substitution
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attack in this scenario. G(m, k) is the integrity code generating function on m using
data owners secret key k.
By contrast with OCT it is not possible to determine whether a particular field
entry is invalid since there is only one integrity code for the entire tuple. If the
integrity code verification fails, it means some field entry in the tuple is invalid. It
has no way to know which field entry in the tuple causes the verification failure. Thus
OCT schemes relinquish fine-grained detection in exchange for a smaller memory
footprint, and fewer ICs that need to be generated.
OCT Query Conversion in the ICDB Basic Model
In the ICDB Basic model, with only two entities, an SQL query needs to be converted
to an ICDB OCT query to request enough information for the ICDB client to verify.
Algorithm C below describes the query conversion.
Algorithm C: OCT-Basic Query Conversion.
Input (an SQL query):
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
Output (an OCT-Basic query):
SELECT A1, . . . At, IC1, . . . ICm, S1, . . . Sm (Actually is SELECT ∗)
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or...Cn;
where T1 . . . Tm are tables from where the data are to fetched, each ICi and Si,
∀i = 1, 2, . . .m, are the IC and serial in each table Ti, C1 . . . Cn are conditions within
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the WHERE clause. A1, . . . , Ar in the input query are some attributes from all tables
T1, . . . Tm, whereas A1, . . . , At in the output query are all attributes for all tables
T1, . . . , Tm. To regenerate IC’s, it is necessary to select all attributes of the entire
tuple. An example of OCT-Basic query conversion is provided using the same Query
1 used in the OCF query conversion example.
The original SQL query for Query 1 is:
SELECT salary FROM salaries WHERE emp no = 1001;
Applying the query conversion Algorithm C, the converted OCT-Basic query is:
SELECT emp no, salary, from date, to date, salaries IC, salaries serial
FROM salaries
WHERE emp no = 1001;
The converted ICDB query for OCT in this example includes additional attributes
such as emp no, from date, to date in addition to the requested attribute salary.
This is because, to regenerate the IC in the integrity verification process by the
ICDB client, all attributes of the table (the entire tuple) are required to be retrieved.
As in OCF schemes, an SQL join query from multiple tables can be converted in
OCT scheme as well. An ICDB join query would require all the attributes from all
the tables that are joined together. In addition to a selection query from a single
table, Algorithm C also describes how to convert a join query from multiple tables.
We use the same Query 2 mentioned in OCF query conversion to demonstrate the
conversion: The original SQL join query for Query 2 is:
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SELECT departments.dept name, dept emp.from date, dept emp.to date
FROM departments, dept emp
WHERE departments.dept no = dept emp.dept no AND
departments.dept no = ’d002’;
The converted OCT-Basic query for Query 2 is:
SELECT *
FROM departments, dept emp
WHERE departments.dept no=dept emp.dept no AND
departments.dept no=’d002’;
Just as with selection and join queries, functional queries are similar to what
has been explained in the OCF query conversion. However, OCT needs to fetch all
attribute values in a tuple even for a query only requesting an aggregate value over a
single attribute. We use the example Query 3 used earlier in OCF query conversion to
demonstrate the OCT query conversion for a functional SQL query with an aggregate
operation.
The original SQL aggregate functional query for Query 3 is:
Select sum (salary) from salaries;
The converted OCT-Basic query for Query 3 is:
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Select * From salaries;
Upon receiving all data from the cloud, the ICDB client will need to verify the
integrity correctness for all received data, including the salary data. If all data pass
the integrity check, the ICDB client can perform the aggregate operation over the
received salary data and then present the aggregate result to the user.
OCT Query Conversion in the ICDB DMV Model (OCT-DMV)
In the DMV model, the communication is among three entities, which are the ICDB
client, the ICDB cloud application and the cloud database server.
OCT Query Conversion in Aggregate Verification Mode: Similar to OCF
schemes, for the aggregate verification mode in OCT schemes, the ICDB client has
to issue a query Q1 to the cloud database server to fetch all those tuples that match
the query conditions along with the corresponding serial numbers (but not the IC’s).
At the same time, the ICDB client also has to issue another query Q2 to the ICDB
cloud application to request an AIC, which is an aggregate integrity code for all the
IC’s corresponding to those tuples retrieved in query Q1.
The query Q1 to be issued to the cloud database server would be similar to the
one in Algorithm C by excluding the integrity codes, whereas the query Q2 to be
issued to the ICDB cloud application would also be similar to the one in Algorithm
C but including only the integrity codes. This query conversion is described by the
Algorithm D below.
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Algorithm D: OCT-DMV Query Conversion
Input (an SQL query):
SELECT A1, A2, . . . Ar FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm WHERE C1 and/or . . . Cn ;
Output (an OCT-DMV query Q1 to the cloud database server and an OCT-
DMV query Q2 to the ICDB cloud application):
OCT -DMV query Q1: to be issued to the cloud database server
SELECT A1, . . . At, S1, . . . Sm
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or...Cn;
OCT -DMV query Q2: to be issued to the ICDB cloud application
SELECT IC1, . . . ICm
FROM T1, T2, . . . Tm
WHERE C1 and/or...Cn;
As in the OCF schemes, upon receiving OCT-DMV query Q1, the cloud database
server will return the requested data and the corresponding serials to the ICDB client.
When the ICDB cloud application receives OCT-DMV query Q2, it will forward the
query to the database server to retrieve all the ICs so that it can generate the AIC.
Finally, the ICDB cloud application will forward the AIC to the ICDB client. After
receiving the AIC and all the data and serials (from Q1), the ICDB client is able to
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check the data integrity by performing an aggregate verification. The AIC generation
in the ICDB cloud application and the aggregate verification process in the ICDB
client will be described later in Section 4.4.
OCT Query Conversion in Detailed Verification Mode: When aggregate
verification fails, it means there is something wrong in the returned dataset (a set of
tuples) as a whole. Similar to the OCF-DMV scheme, the OCT-DMV scheme also
provides the data owner with an option to either discard the dataset and stop, or
verify the data further in the detail mode to identify which particular tuple has been
compromised. To verify in the detail mode, the ICDB client has to issue the same
query Q2 to the cloud database server again to fetch all the IC’s so that it can verify
each individual tuple.
4.4 Aggregate Integrity Code Generation and Verification
We use different approaches to construct the Aggregate Integrity Code (AIC) de-
pending on which cryptographic algorithm is used in generating ICs. In the previous
examples, the query Q2 fetches all the ICs to the ICDB cloud application from the
cloud database server. If ICs are generated using the RSA algorithm, its homomorphic
property allows multiplication to be performed on ciphers (or ICs here) without
decrypting it. Making use of this property, the ICDB cloud application can modularly
multiply all the fetched ICs together to generate a single AIC. According to the
variable definitions in Section 4.1, let’s assume query Q1 returns a set of information
collections M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mr}, which includes a dataset D = {d1, d2, . . . , dr}
and their serial numbers S = {s1, s2, . . . , sr}, to the ICDB client. We also assume
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query Q2 fetches the corresponding ICSet = {IC1, IC2, . . . , ICr} to the ICDB cloud
application. Equation 4.12 below describes the AIC generation for RSA algorithm.
AIC =
r∏
i=1
ICi mod N (4.12)
If ICs are generated by MAC algorithms (CMAC AES or HMAC SHA), the ICDB
cloud application can generate a single AIC by concatenating all the ICs fetched from
the cloud database server and then applying a hashing algorithm (SHA-256) to the
concatenated ICs. The produced digest or result is the AIC. Equation 4.13 describes
the AIC generation for MAC algorithms.
AIC = H(IC1 + IC2 + . . . + ICr) (4.13)
where H() is a hashing function implementing the SHA-256 hash algorithm.
After the AIC is generated and returned to the ICDB client, along with all the
data returned by the query Q2, the ICDB client can then perform the AV mode
verification. In the AV mode verification, if RSA is the IC generating function, the
ICDB client has to compute the aggregate data by modularly multiplying all mi, for
all data items di in the return dataset. The AIC can be regenerated by applying
the RSA algorithm to the aggregate data. Equation 4.14 below describes this AIC
regeneration by the ICDB client.
AIC = Sig(
r∏
i=1
mi mod N) = (
r∏
i=1
mi)
y mod N (4.14)
According to Equation 4.4, each ICi = Sig(mi) = (mi)
y mod N , where y is the RSA
private key and N is the RSA public modulus. The AIC constructed in Equation 4.12
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by the ICDB cloud application should match with the regenerated AIC in Equation
4.14 by the ICDB client. The following derivation shows this.
Original AIC =
∏r
i=1 ICi mod N
= IC1 × IC2 × . . .× ICr mod N
= my1 ×my2 × . . .×myr mod N
= (m1 ×m2 × . . .mr)y mod N
= (
∏r
i=1mi)
y mod N
= Regenerated AIC
IF the IC generation function is one of the MAC algorithms (CMAC AES or
HMAC SHA), the ICDB client has to regenerate all the integrity codes for all the
returned data mi and then regenerate the AIC from all the regenerated ICs. Equation
4.15 shows this AIC regeneration by the ICDB client.
AIC = H(MAC(m1) + MAC(m2) + . . . + MAC(mr)) (4.15)
where H() is an SHA-256 hash function and MAC() is either the CMAC AES or the
HMAC SHA algorithm. The original AIC based on Equation 4.13 generated by the
ICDB cloud application should match the AIC based on Equation 4.15 regenerated
by the ICDB client since each ICi = MAC(mi) and thus
Original AIC = H(IC1 + IC2 + . . . + ICr)
= H(MAC(m1) + MAC(m2) + . . . + MAC(mr))
= Regenerated AIC
Finally if the regenerated AIC does not match with the returned AIC from the
ICDB cloud application, an integrity violation message will be sent to the user.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Hardware and Software Used
All of our ICDB prototype implementation, testing, and benchmarking were per-
formed at Boise State University’s Onyx server (See Appendix B for specifications).
MySQL (MariaDB) was used as the underlying database management system, using
InnoDB as its database engine. For database conversion (initial IC code generation
and insertion), query conversion, and query verification, we have implemented all the
modules with JAVA SE 1.8 and made them available in [16].
To test against a database with real data, we have chosen a sample MySQL
database publicly available online: Employees (v1.0.6) [21] (See Appendix A). The
database has size of 196.4 MB with close to 4 million tuples, which includes six tables
employees, departments, dept manager, dept emp, titles, salaries. Before
each experiment, the databases were returned to their original state for fair compar-
ison.
We tested all possible combinations of RSA, CMAC-AES, and HMAC-SHA with
different granularities of protection levels in OCF and OCT schemes, for a total of 6
different ICDB implementations in each of the ICDB Basic model and in the ICDB
DMV model. RSA uses a 1024-bit (fixed size) output for all integrity codes. AES
outputs a 128-bit IC using a CMAC, SHA outputs a 128-bit IC using an HMAC, and
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both are given a 128-bit key as input.
As mentioned in the introduction, the metrics to evaluate the proposed ICDB
approach are: integrity protection, memory penalty, and performance penalty. The
following sections show the results in evaluating each metric over a standard database
and its converted ICDB counterpart. All results in this section are based on the
Employees database provided by MySQL [21].
5.2 Integrity Protection
If an ICDB cannot verify the integrity of the protected data, then there is no advan-
tage of using it over a standard database. The highest priority of this thesis is to test
whether the ICDB is able to detect various kinds of malicious attacks. The following
attacks have been tested with our ICDB prototype which also answers the Question
1 stated in section 1.1.1.
5.2.1 Forgery Attack
A forgery attack is an attack that mutates or alters fields in a database. This could
involve either the manipulation of the data itself, or its integrity code. Since there
is no feasible way within a reasonable amount of time to generate an IC without the
private key of the data owner, the ICDB should be able to detect this kind of attack.
For testing, we modified some attribute values and a few IC codes. Our ICDB
prototype was able to detect such modifications.
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5.2.2 Substitution Attack
A substitution attack modifies fields by replacing them with other existing fields
within the database. This could include copying and replacing a field somewhere
else, moving data around, or swapping data from the same row/column. In OCT
schemes, the IC is cryptographically generated by concatenating the entire tuple
with the table name and thus is unique. It is not possible to substitute among tuples
without being detected. It is also not possible to substitute some fields within a tuple
without being detected since the IC is generated based on the original tuple as a
whole. In OCF schemes, since primary key (row identity), attribute name (column
identity) and the table name concatenated together with the field data will make
the collection of information unique and thus make the integrity code unique, it is
not possible to swap field’s value or an IC from other places (e.g., different rows and
columns) without being detected.
To test the substitution attack, we swapped the field values and ICs of attributes
from date and to date in salaries table. Our ICDB prototype was able to de-
tect this attack due to the uniqueness of the attribute name within a table. Also,
swapping the values of attributes from date and to date of two tables salaries
and dept manager was detected due to the uniqueness maintained by the table name
within a database, though the four attributes have the same data type.
Replacement Attack:
A replacement attack in OCT schemes moves the value of one field (or more) and
concatenates that value with the value of a neighboring field. A replacement attack
in OCF schemes moves part of the Primary Key value to another attribute.
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In a replacement attack on an OCT scheme, the overall data within a tuple
will not be altered but the position of some data will be changed. For example,
certain characters from one attribute value may be moved and attached to some
other attribute value.
To test for a replacement attack on an OCT granularity scheme, a prefix substring
from attribute last name was moved to the end of first name in employees table,
keeping the overall tuple data unaltered. The presence of the inter-field delimiter
affects the calculation of the IC, making the IC of the changed row different from the
IC on the original data.
To test the attack for an OCF granularity scheme, a number from the value in the
Primary Key emp no was moved to the end of value in that row’s salary attribute.
The modified salary value, its IC and serial were then copied to the corresponding
attributes in a different tuple whose Primary Key value is equal to the value of the
now-modified Primary Key. For an example replacement attack, an emp no with value
’11001’ and salary with value ’11677’ was modified by moving the first number ’1’
from ’11001’ to the end of ’11677’ creating a new salary value ’116771’. This new
salary value along with its corresponding IC and serial were copied to a tuple with
primary key ’1001’. In this case as well, the use of a delimiter in between the Attribute
value and the Primary Key aided in detecting the replacement of the numbers.
5.2.3 Old-Data Attack
An old-data attack means the cloud returns data which has been previously updated
or deleted. Because each IC contains a serial number and the data owner has a private
list of revoked serial numbers in their ICRL, old-data attacks can be detected if the
data owner keeps the ICRL up-to-date.
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To test for an old-data attack, several tuples in the salaries table were deleted
by the ICDB client. These deleted rows were then re-inserted (with the same data
value, serial and IC) into the ICDB database. In a normal process, adding previously
deleted data back into the database, a new serial number should be used. In this test,
we used the old serial number to re-insert the deleted data for the purpose of testing
old-data attacks. The re-inserted old data was successfully detected by scanning the
ICRL file.
5.2.4 Tuple Insertion Attack
A tuple insertion attack introduces new rows in the database. This could be a
completely new fake tuple, a tuple containing data copies from other rows, or a
duplicate of another tuple.
To test a tuple insertion attack, new rows were added to the departments table
with random ICs or with ICs copied from other tuples. These modifications were also
detected by our prototype.
5.2.5 Tuple Deletion Attack
A tuple deletion attack removes existing tuples from the database. Because we do
not guarantee completeness, it is not possible to know whether a targeted data item
is missing from a query result being fetched.
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5.3 Memory Penalty
A memory penalty is an obvious trade-off for obtaining integrity protection in an
ICDB since the database needs extra fields to store ICs and serial numbers. The fol-
lowing charts illustrate the database size increase for all six ICDB combinations with
different cryptographic algorithms and different protection granularities as discussed
earlier. This section answers the Question 2 stated in section 1.1.1.
To interpret the experimental result easily, we define a memory penalty rate as
memory penalty rate =
size of the ICDB database
size of the SQL database
(5.1)
where the rate indicates the database size increase rate for an ICDB database com-
pared to the original SQL database.
Figure 5.1 and the raw data in Table 5.1 display the size increase between the
Employees DB [21] and its ICDB counterparts using MAC algorithms (CMAC and
HMAC) in OCT and in OCF. Since both HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES generate a
128-bit integrity code, the ICDB sizes are the same for both algorithms.
A quick comparison between granularity schemes reveals that the memory penalty
rate for the MAC-OCT is about 1.53, while the memory penalty rate for the MAC-
OCF is 3.15. This means MAC-OCF is larger in size than that of MAC-OCT by a
factor of 2.05.
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Figure 5.1: Database sizes: DB is the original Employees SQL database; MAC-OCT
and MAC-OCF are the Employees ICDB databases using 128-bit HMAC or CMAC
integrity code implementing the OCT scheme and the OCF scheme, respectively.
Sizes are displayed in megabytes.
Table 5.1: Database sizes: DB is the original Employees SQL database; MAC-OCT
and MAC-OCF are the Employees ICDB databases using 128-bit HMAC or CMAC
integrity code implementing the OCT scheme and the OCF scheme, respectively.
Sizes are displayed in Megabytes.
Size (MB) Memory Penalty Rate
DB 196.44
MAC-OCT 300.61 1.53
MAC-OCF 619 3.15
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Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 show the size increase again, but this time using 1024-bit
RSA integrity code. The memory penalty rate defined in Equation 5.1 for the RSA-
OCT is about 3.88 compared to the original database, while RSA-OCF database
size is increased by a memory penalty rate of 13.07. Thus, RSA-OCF resulted in
a database with 3.37 times larger size than that of RSA-OCT. By the experimental
results above, it is clear that OCT is a better choice over OCF with respect to memory
cost.
Though different databases may have a different memory penalty rate, the experi-
mental result based on the example Employees database still gives us an approximate
idea of how much memory penalty will be if the ICDB technique is used to protect
data integrity.
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Figure 5.2: Database sizes for the original Employees SQL database, and the
converted ICDB RSA-OCT and RSA-OCF databases respectively. Sizes are displayed
in megabytes
Table 5.2: Database sizes for the original Employees SQL database, and the
converted ICDB RSA-OCT and RSA-OCF databases respectively. Sizes are displayed
in Megabytes
Size (MB) Memory Penalty Rate
DB 196.44
RSA-OCT 762.06 3.88
RSA-OCF 2567.78 13.07
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5.4 Performance Penalty
To evaluate the performance penalty, we focused on testing the performance of query
processing in ICDB and in the standard SQL database. This thesis has evaluated
different type of queries such as SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE, JOIN and a
Functional Query. In a standard SQL database, these type of queries are well-defined.
However, to perform these queries in ICDB, the process of each query needs to be
changed accordingly. Though we have described how to change the queries in ICDB in
previous chapters, we will describe the query process in steps again when we present
its performance penalty in later sections. This section explains the Question 3 stated
in section 1.1.1
To present the performance penalty for queries, we define a performance penalty
rate as
performance penalty rate =
time required to conduct the ICDB query
time required to conduct the SQL query
(5.2)
We will present the performance penalty rate for each type of query in later sections
based on our experimental results. Note that different ICDB queries may have
different query process steps.
5.4.1 Experimental Results for the Basic ICDB Model
In this thesis, We have proposed two ICDB models, the Basic model and the Dual
Mode Verification (DMV) model. This section will show and analyze our experimental
results in the Basic model.
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SELECT
In a standard SQL database, a SELECT query only contains one step - the execution
of the query in the database server, i.e., to fetch data. However, an ICDB SELECT
query has three steps as described below.
ICDB SELECT query process steps in the Basic model:
1. Query conversion: The ICDB client converts an SQL SELECT query to an
ICDB SELECT query as described in Algorithms A and C in Chapter 4,
and then issues the query to the cloud database server.
2. Query execution (Data fetching): The cloud database server executes the
ICDB SELECT query over the ICDB database, and then returns the query
result.
3. Query result verification: The ICDB client verifies the returned query result.
This section presents the performance penalty of the ICDB SELECT query, using a
SELECT * query on the salaries table in Employees database under the basic ICDB
model described in section 3.1. The experimental results are shown in three figures
and three tables, one for each algorithm (HMAC-SHA, CMAC-AES, and RSA). Each
figure shows three data points a) Query process time (only query execution) for a
standard database, b) Query process time for an ICDB OCT counterpart, and c)
Query process time for ICDB OCF counterpart. The X-axis in the figure shows the
number of tuples fetched in thousands and the Y-axis shows the time in milliseconds.
Although query conversion is a part of every query process in the ICDB, it is not
shown in the figures due to its negligible average time of about 25ms.
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Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 (and Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5) show that each data point
roughly scales linearly with the amount of data queried for all three algorithms. The
figures and tables also show that query result verification takes significantly more time
compared to the data fetching (i.e., query execution). This result is expected since
the verification process must regenerate all the ICs for the returned data. Generating
an IC is time-consuming since it is a cryptographic operation. The operation is
especially expensive if the RSA algorithm is used. Verification time in an OCF scheme
is greater than that in an OCT scheme because there are more ICs to regenerate (for
verification) in OCF than in OCT.
The Performance Penalty Rate for an ICDB SELECT query using CMAC-AES is
the least of all three algorithms with 11.07 and 25.24 on average in OCT and OCF
respectively. The rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 13.29 and 31.39 on
average in OCT and OCF respectively. While for RSA, the penalty rate is greatest
with 104.81 and 389.21 on average in OCT and OCF respectively.
The overall query process time (query conversion time, data fetching time and
verification time) in OCF is a little more than 2 times, on average, than the time used
in OCT with MAC algorithms. While using the RSA, the overall query processing
time in OCF takes roughly 4 times more than the time used in OCT.
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Figure 5.3: Using HMAC-SHA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over
the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.3: Using HMAC-SHA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 0 34.8
OCT 130.4 252.2 382.6 10.99425287
OCF 201.4 688.6 890 25.57471264
100k
DB 60.2 0 60.2
OCT 354.2 582.4 936.6 15.55813953
OCF 427.6 1492.8 1920.4 31.90033223
150k
DB 79.2 0 79.2
OCT 442.6 691 1133.6 14.31313131
OCF 556.8 2053.4 2610.2 32.95707071
200k
DB 107.8 0 107.8
OCT 530.6 766.2 1296.8 12.0296846
OCF 811.8 2621 3432.8 31.84415584
60
Figure 5.4: Using CMAC-AES, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over
the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.4: Using CMAC-AES, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 0 34.8
OCT 141 168.2 309.2 8.885057471
OCF 224.4 407.4 631.8 18.15517241
100k
DB 60.2 0 60.2
OCT 287.2 428.6 715.8 11.89036545
OCF 414.2 1074.6 1488.8 24.73089701
150k
DB 79.2 0 79.2
OCT 399.8 477 876.8 11.07070707
OCF 600.2 1513.8 2114 26.69191919
200k
DB 107.8 0 107.8
OCT 540.8 680.4 1221.2 11.3283859
OCF 749.8 2136 2885.8 26.76994434
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Figure 5.5: Using RSA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for differ-
ent number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.5: Using RSA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for differ-
ent number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query over the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 0 34.8
OCT 153 2804.2 2957.2 84.97701149
OCF 222.6 10712.8 10935.4 314.2356322
100k
DB 60.2 0 60.2
OCT 303.8 5759 6062.8 100.7109635
OCF 475.6 21409 21884.6 363.5315615
150k
DB 79.2 0 79.2
OCT 418 8371.6 8789.6 110.979798
OCF 646.4 32274.2 32920.6 415.6641414
200k
DB 107.8 0 107.8
OCT 571.2 11175.4 11746.6 108.9666048
OCF 1224.8 42820.8 44045.6 408.5862709
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We can interpret the results in Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 (and Tables 5.3 5.4, and
5.5) in a different perspective. Rather than the performance penalty rate, a process
rate is defined as
Process Rate =
Total fetched user data size in MB
Total processing time
(5.3)
where the total fetched user data does not include the fetched ICs and serials, and
the total processing time includes the query conversion time, query execution time
and the query result verification time. In short, the Process Rate means how many
MB of user data can be processed (in ICDB) per second.
Figure 5.6 and the corresponding Table 5.6 show that the Process Rate for HMAC-
SHA is 3.93 MB/sec in OCT and 1.68 MB/sec in OCF. CMAC-AES has similar but
slightly higher rates than HMAC-SHA, with 4.78 MB/sec in OCT and 2.15 MB/sec
in OCF. RSA, by comparison, processes at a much slower rate of 0.501 MB/sec in
OCT and 0.134 MB/sec in OCF. Thus in the basic ICDB model, CMAC-AES in
OCT scheme has the highest (best) Process Rate among the six combinations.
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Figure 5.6: A chart plotted for Basic ICDB model showing the process rate, i.e.,
how much user data (size in MB) can be processed in a SELECT * query using three
different algorithms in OCT or in OCF. The leftmost bar marked as DB is the process
rate for a standard SQL database.
Table 5.6: A table with raw data for the Basic ICDB model showing the process
rate, i.e., how much user data (size in MB) can be processed in a SELECT * query
using three different algorithms in OCT or in OCF. The data in the DB row is the
process rate for a standard SQL database.
DB 51.41
HMAC-SHA CMAC-AES RSA
OCT 3.93 4.78 0.501
OCF 1.68 2.15 0.134
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INSERT
To perform an INSERT query in an ICDB:
ICDB INSERT query process steps in the Basic model:
1. Query conversion: Convert an SQL INSERT query to an ICDB INSERT
query. This step requires generating an IC for each data item to be inserted
with a new and unique serial number. The ICDB client then issues this
converted ICDB INSERT query to the cloud database server.
2. Query execution: The database server inserts all the data items, as well as
the ICs and serials into the ICDB database.
We evaluate the performance using an INSERT query on the Employees.salaries
table. The results are shown in three figures (and three tables), one for each algorithm
(HMAC-SHA, CMAC-AES, and RSA). Each figure shows two data points: a) the
query conversion time: to generate the ICs and serials for all the data to be inserted
and b) the query execution time: to insert all the data and their ICs and serials into
the database.
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show that each data point roughly scales linearly with
the amount of data inserted. The only difference is the scaling factor for each data
point. Note that in the SELECT query the query conversion time is minor and can
be ignored. However, the query conversion process in the INSERT query contributes
a major part of the overall performance penalty because query conversion needs to
generate ICs (an expensive operation) for those data to be inserted.
The average Performance Penalty Rate for an INSERT query using CMAC-AES
is the lowest among all three algorithms with 2.68 and 4.94 in OCT and OCF
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respectively. The penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 2.69 and 5.14
on average in OCT and OCF respectively. While for RSA, the penalty rate is the
highest with 6.62 and 21.01 on average in OCT and OCF respectively.
Also, note in Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 (and Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9) that conversion
and execution time for HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES are roughly equal. While for
RSA, conversion time on average is 2.45 times and 3.27 times greater than execution
time in OCT and OCF respectively.
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Figure 5.7: Using HMAC-SHA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.7: Using HMAC-SHA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Conversion Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 0 851.2 851.2
OCT 813.8 1155.8 1969.6 2.313909774
OCF 1543.4 2211.6 3755 4.411419173
100k
DB 0 1579.8 1579.8
OCT 2061.2 2319.6 4380.8 2.773009242
OCF 3584.2 4755.6 8339.8 5.279022661
150k
DB 0 2305.6 2305.6
OCT 3032 3579.4 6611.4 2.867539903
OCF 5757.6 6231.8 11989.4 5.200121443
200k
DB 0 2966.2 2966.2
OCT 3652.2 4630.8 8283 2.792461736
OCF 8080.6 8746.2 16826.8 5.672847414
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Figure 5.8: Using CMAC-AES, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.8: Using CMAC-AES, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Conversion Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 0 851.2 851.2
OCT 832 1158.6 1990.6 2.338580827
OCF 1389.8 2267.2 3657 4.296287594
100k
DB 0 1579.8 1579.8
OCT 2080.2 2622.8 4703 2.976959109
OCF 3464.6 5595.2 9059.8 5.734776554
150k
DB 0 2305.6 2305.6
OCT 2910.6 3397.6 6308.2 2.736034004
OCF 5091.4 7262 12353.4 5.357997918
200k
DB 0 2966.2 2966.2
OCT 3566.6 4316 7882.6 2.657474209
OCF 7097.8 8825 15922.8 5.368080372
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Figure 5.9: Using RSA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for dif-
ferent number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.9: Using RSA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for dif-
ferent number of tuples inserted (in thousands) by the INSERT query into the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Conversion Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 0 851.2 851.2
OCT 3393.4 1513.4 4906.8 5.764567669
OCF 12355.6 3521.8 15877.4 18.65296053
100k
DB 0 1579.8 1579.8
OCT 7392.8 3917.6 11310.4 7.159387264
OCF 24606 7858 32464 20.54943664
150k
DB 0 2305.6 2305.6
OCT 10597 4086.4 14683.4 6.368580847
OCF 37686.2 11234.8 48921 21.21833796
200k
DB 0 2966.2 2966.2
OCT 15200.4 4922.4 20122.8 6.784033443
OCF 48782.4 15863 64645.4 21.79401254
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DELETE
An ICDB DELETE query needs to fetch the data to be deleted back to the ICDB
client to ensure these data are valid and their serial numbers are recorded in the local
ICRL file. Thus, an ICDB DELETE query contains the following steps:
ICDB DELETE query process steps in the Basic model:
1. Data fetch: The ICDB client needs to issue a SELECT query to fetch the
data to be deleted from the database server.
2. Verification: The ICDB client verifies the fetched data.
3. Query execution: If all fetched data is verified, the ICDB client will issue the
DELETE query and the cloud database server will execute the DELETE.
4. ICRL update: Revoke the serial numbers in the ICRL after the DELETE
operation is done.
We also analyzed the benchmarks of the time it takes to delete the data and their
corresponding integrity codes, using a DELETE query on the Employees.salaries
table. The DELETE operation must verify the data to be deleted, before executing
the query. Each figure shows three data points a) Query process time (only query
execution) for a standard database, b) Query process time of the corresponding
SELECT query plus Query execution time for an ICDB OCT counterpart, and c)
Query process time of the corresponding SELECT query plus Query execution time
for an ICDB OCF counterpart. The X-axis in the figure shows the number of tuples
deleted in thousands and the Y-axis shows the time in milliseconds. The time required
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to update the ICRL file is insignificant compared to the required time for other steps
of DELETE query process.
Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 (and Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12) show that each data
point roughly scales linearly with the amount of data deleted. The only difference
is the scaling factor for each data point. Also, not that DELETE query execution
takes much larger time than other SQL queries (such as SELECT, INSERT) for
the standard database itself. This is because a DELETE query on a table requires
checking each referential integrity constraint in which the table is a parent. Also, for
a large number of tuples being deleted, MySQL needs to maintain a large transaction
log which is also time consuming.
For HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES, DELETE query execution time takes most of
the total query process time, but it is not the case for RSA schemes. For RSA-OCT
the verification time is almost equal to the DELETE query execution time, whereas
for RSA-OCF the verification time takes the majority of the total query process time.
This is because the verification process requires regenerating ICs for all the data to be
deleted, in which RSA will take more time to regenerate ICs than the MAC algorithm
does.
The average performance penalty rate for DELETE query using CMAC-AES is
the lowest among all three algorithms with 1.53 in OCT and 1.25 in OCF. The average
penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 1.62 in OCT and 1.25 in OCF.
While for RSA, the average penalty rate is the highest with 2.39 in OCT and 5.75 in
OCF.
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Figure 5.10: Using HMAC-SHA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.10: Using HMAC-SHA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification ICRL Revoke Execution Total Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 135.2 247 36.6 2766 3184.8 1.237584519
OCF 189.8 677.6 140.8 3293.4 4301.6 1.671562913
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 301.8 515.8 58.4 5292.8 6168.8 1.283829344
OCF 414.2 1332.4 308.8 5862.8 7918.2 1.647908429
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 406.8 691.6 79.6 7421.6 8599.6 1.207130825
OCF 585.6 1813.6 407.4 8516.8 11323.4 1.589472207
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 525.6 814 104.8 10001.6 11446 1.210218021
OCF 739.4 2531 515.8 11056.2 14842.4 1.569329019
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Figure 5.11: Using CMAC-AES, plotted query process time in milliseconds for
different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.11: Using CMAC-AES, query process time raw data in milliseconds for
different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification ICRL Revoke Execution Total Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 151.6 193.6 40.4 2808.2 3193.8 1.241081837
OCF 221.8 458.6 156.6 3227.6 4064.6 1.579466853
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 279 373.2 54.6 5581.4 6288.2 1.30867846
OCF 428.2 991.6 287.2 5662.8 7369.8 1.533777315
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 380 553.8 69.4 7821.6 8824.8 1.23874228
OCF 654.6 1371.6 397.6 8316.8 10740.6 1.507664234
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 517.6 678.4 93.4 10201.6 11491 1.214975999
OCF 735.6 1677 498.8 11256.2 14167.6 1.497980503
73
Figure 5.12: Using RSA, plotted query process time in milliseconds for dif-
ferent number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.12: Using RSA, query process time raw data in milliseconds for dif-
ferent number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification ICRL Revoke Execution Total Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 130.8 2807 32.4 3277 6247.2 2.427605502
OCF 234.4 10730.8 185.4 3378.6 14529.2 5.645915909
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 296.6 5780.2 59.8 5111.8 11248.4 2.340978148
OCF 450 21310.4 290 5640.2 27690.6 5.762872008
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 407.6 8446 73 8136.8 17063.4 2.395199326
OCF 640.8 31763.8 397.4 8218.6 41020.6 5.758085345
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 547.4 11239.4 98 10794 22678.8 2.397893802
OCF 882.4 42683.4 486.6 11136.2 55188.6 5.835247098
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UPDATE
The UPDATE operation mirrors both DELETE and INSERT as it is functionally
equivalent to first DELETE a data item (or a set of data items) and then INSERT a
new data item (or a new set of data items). The performance penalty for an ICDB
UPDATE query can be analyzed based on the performance penalty presented earlier
in both ICDB DELETE and ICDB INSERT.
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JOIN
To perform a JOIN query in ICDB requires the following steps:
ICDB JOIN query process steps in the Basic model:
1. Query Conversion: The ICDB client converts an SQL JOIN query to an
ICDB JOIN query (See Algorithms A and C in Chapter 4) and then issues
the query to the database server.
2. Query Execution (Data fetch): The database server executes the query to
fetch and return data to the ICDB client.
3. Verification: The ICDB client verifies the fetched data.
In our experiment for the JOIN query, attributes from Employees.employees
and Employees.salaries tables were joined together. The JOIN query used for
the experiment was SELECT * FROM employees, salaries WHERE employ-
ees.emp no = salaries.emp no;
Figure 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and Tables 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 show the time to process an
ICDB JOIN query in the Basic model. The verification process in the JOIN query
contributes more to the overall performance penalty than the query execution (data
fetching) in both OCT and OCF because verification needs to regenerate ICs. Again,
the verification time in OCF is greater than that in OCT because there are more ICs
to regenerate in OCF than in OCT.
The average Performance Penalty Rate for the ICDB JOIN query using CMAC-
AES is the lowest among all three algorithms with 12.18 in OCT and 31.73 in OCF.
The average penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 13.56 in OCT and
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36.36 in OCF. For RSA, the average penalty rate is the highest with 89.05 in OCT
and 407.41 in OCF.
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Figure 5.13: HMAC-SHA plotted for a Query joining the Employees.employees
and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for
the number of tuples selected (in thousands).
Table 5.13: HMAC-SHA raw data for a Query joining the Employees.employees
and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for
the number of tuples selected (in thousands).
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 221.68 658 879.68 13.53353846
OCF 342.38 1688.4 2030.78 31.24276923
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 602.14 1078 1680.14 13.54951613
OCF 726.92 3754 4480.92 36.13645161
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 752.42 1653.8 2406.22 13.59446328
OCF 946.56 5635 6581.56 37.1839548
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 902.02 2152 3054.02 13.57342222
OCF 1380.06 7815.8 9195.86 40.87048889
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Figure 5.14: CMAC-AES plotted for a Query joining the Employees.employees
and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for
the number of tuples selected (in thousands).
Table 5.14: CMAC-AES raw data for a Query joining the Employees.employees
and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for
the number of tuples selected (in thousands).
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 239.7 498.8 738.5 11.36153846
OCF 381.48 1666.2 2047.68 31.50276923
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 488.24 916.8 1405.04 11.33096774
OCF 704.14 3019.4 3723.54 30.02854839
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 679.66 1651.2 2330.86 13.16870056
OCF 1020.34 5318.6 6338.94 35.81322034
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 919.36 1974 2893.36 12.85937778
OCF 1274.66 7382 8656.66 38.47404444
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Figure 5.15: RSA plotted for a Query joining the Employees.employees and the
Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for the
number of tuples selected (in thousands).
Table 5.15: RSA raw data for a Query joining the Employees.employees and the
Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in milliseconds) for the number
of tuples selected (in thousands).
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 260.1 5199.8 5459.9 83.99846154
OCF 378.42 25458.4 25836.82 397.4895385
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 516.46 10113 10629.46 85.72145161
OCF 808.52 47549.4 48357.92 389.9832258
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 710.6 15725.6 16436.2 92.85988701
OCF 1098.88 71085.6 72184.48 407.8219209
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 971.04 20099.8 21070.84 93.64817778
OCF 2082.16 95642 97724.16 434.3296
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Functional Query
To perform a functional query, all the data items used to evaluate the aggregate value
in the functional query must be fetched and verified. Thus, an ICDB functional query
will need to perform the following steps:
ICDB Function query process steps in the Basic model:
1. Data fetch: The ICDB client will need to issue a SELECT query to fetch
the required data for evaluating the aggregate operation.
2. Verification: The ICDB verifies the fetched data.
3. Query execution in local: The ICDB client now is able to Compute the
aggregate value based on the fetched data. The aggregate function could
be SUM, MIN, MAX, AVG, or COUNT.
Figures 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 and Tables 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 show the experimental results
for an ICDB Functional query. The Functional query used for this experiment includes
four aggregate operations (SUM, MIN, MAX, AVG) in a single Functional query. The
data shows that the process time for a functional query is similar to the corresponding
SELECT query process time. The only additional time required is the time for the
ICDB client to locally compute the aggregate values over the verified data from the
SELECT query, which is negligible. It is also noted that for OCF, the functional
query take less time than the SELECT query in our previous experiment. This is
because the corresponding SELECT query for the Functional query must fetch only
the Employees.salaries and its related attributes for verification. For OCT, all the
attributes in the tuple must be fetched.
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The average performance penalty rate for Functional query using CMAC-AES is
the lowest among all three algorithms with 30.09 in OCT and 47.82 in OCF. The
average penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 36.05 in OCT and 53.46
in OCF. While for RSA, the average penalty rate is the highest with 197.38 in OCT
and 534.33 in OCF.
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Figure 5.16: HMAC-SHA plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against num-
ber of tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding
to the Functional Query
Table 5.16: HMAC-SHA plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against num-
ber of tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding
to the Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 130.4 435.2 565.6 32.50574713
OCF 140.98 608.8 749.78 43.0908046
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 354.2 809.6 1163.8 38.66445183
OCF 299.32 1357 1656.32 55.02724252
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 442.6 1025.6 1468.2 37.07575758
OCF 389.76 1824.6 2214.36 55.91818182
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 530.6 1407.2 1937.8 35.95176252
OCF 568.26 2655.6 3223.86 59.81187384
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Figure 5.17: CMAC-AES plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against num-
ber of tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding
to the Functional Query
Table 5.17: CMAC-AES plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against number
of tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding to
the Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 141 338 479 27.52873563
OCF 157.08 517.4 674.48 38.76321839
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 287.2 701.2 988.4 32.8372093
OCF 289.94 1255.2 1545.14 51.33355482
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 399.8 758.6 1158.4 29.25252525
OCF 420.14 1538.6 1958.74 49.46313131
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 540.8 1117 1657.8 30.75695733
OCF 524.86 2262.6 2787.46 51.71539889
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Figure 5.18: RSA plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against number of
tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding to the
Functional Query
Table 5.18: RSA plotted with time required (in milliseconds) against number of
tuples (in thousands) returned using an ICDB SELECT Query corresponding to the
Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 153 2843 2996 172.183908
OCF 155.82 7879.8 8035.62 461.8172414
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 303.8 5461.4 5765.2 191.5348837
OCF 332.92 15156.8 15489.72 514.6086379
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 418 8071.6 8489.6 214.3838384
OCF 452.48 22721 23173.48 585.1888889
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 571.2 10823.6 11394.8 211.406308
OCF 857.36 30173.8 31031.16 575.7172542
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5.4.2 Experimental Results for the Dual Mode Verification (DMV) Model
In this section, we will present and analyze our experimental results for the ICDB
DMV model as described in Section 3.2. In order to minimize network variability for
our experiments, all three entities in the DMV model: cloud database server, ICDB
cloud application and ICDB client, were run on the same machine (see Appendix B
for machine specifications). However, in the real world, these three entities should be
hosted by different machines in different sites. The purpose of having the DMV model,
rather than the Basic model, is to reduce the network loads (downloading/uploading
ICs between the ICDB client and the cloud database server).
DMV model includes two different verification modes: aggregate verification mode
and an optional detailed verification mode. For an ICDB query process, DV mode
does not involve the ICDB cloud application, whereas AV mode involves all three
entities. The figures in this section include only the experimental results for AV
mode because all the processes (and thus the performance) for the DV mode would
be the same as those in the basic ICDB model presented in the previous section 5.4.1.
SELECT
In a standard SQL database, a SELECT query only contains one step - the execution
of the query in the database server, i.e., to fetch data. However, in the AV mode
of the DMV model, an ICDB SELECT query has the following steps as described
below.
ICDB SELECT query process steps in the AV mode of DMV model:
1. Query conversion: ICDB client converts an SQL SELECT query to two
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ICDB SELECT queries Q1 and Q2 as described in Algorithms B and D in
Chapter 4, and then issues the queries Q1 and Q2 to the cloud database
server and the ICDB cloud application, respectively.
2. Query Q2 processing has two major steps.
(a) IC fetch: The ICDB cloud application forwards query Q2 to the cloud
database server to retrieve all the corresponding ICs.
(b) AIC generation: The cloud application generates an Aggregate In-
tegrity Code (AIC) and then returns it to the ICDB client.
3. Query Q1 processing has two major steps.
(a) Data fetch: Query Q1 fetches data and serial numbers (but not the
corresponding ICs) from the ICDB database and returns them to the
ICDB client.
(b) Verification: Upon receiving data and serial numbers through Q1 and
an AIC through Q2, the ICDB client verifies the data integrity by
regenerating an AIC from the fetched Q1 result and then match it
with the AIC returned by Q2.
This section presents the performance penalty of the ICDB SELECT query, using
a SELECT * query on the Employees.salaries table in the aggregate verification
mode of the DMV model described in section 3.2. The experimental results are
shown in three figures and three tables, one for each algorithm (HMAC-SHA, CMAC-
AES, and RSA). Each figure shows three data points a) Query process time (only
query execution) for a standard database, b) Query process time for the ICDB OCT
counterpart, and c) Query process time for the ICDB OCF counterpart. Although
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query conversion is a part of the query process in the ICDB, it is not shown in the
figures due to its negligible duration.
The ICDB client sends the ICDB query Q1 to the cloud database server to fetch
the data and their serials and sends the ICDB query Q2 to the cloud application
requesting the AIC. Since the requests are asynchronous, the query process time with
the longest of the two queries could be considered as the best case. However, we
benchmarked and reported the total processing time as the summation of both Q1’s
and Q2’s processing time. In Figures 5.21, 5.20 and 5.19, the reported time for IC
Fetch and AIC generation are the processing time for Q2, while the reported time for
Data Fetch and verification are the processing time for Q1.
Observing the experimental results from Figures 5.21, 5.20 and 5.19 (and Tables
5.21, 5.20 and 5.19), we list some notable results below.
1. AIC generation time (by cloud application) is relatively less than the verification
time (by ICDB client) for both CMAC-AES and HMAC-SHA. This is due to
the fact that the ICDB client has to regenerate all the ICs for the data fetched
in the verification step. While the cloud application just has to fetch all ICs
from the cloud database server to generate the AIC.
2. In the best case scenario when both Q1 and Q2 are processed simultaneously,
one need only consider the longer time taken by Q1 or Q2 while analyzing
the performance penalty. In this scenario, RSA performance is quite similar
to CMAC-AES and HMAC-SHA in both OCT and OCF. Note that RSA
performance is much worse compared to the CMAC-AES and HMAC-AES in
the Basic model.
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3. In the worst case scenario when considering the summation of the time taken by
both Q1 and Q2, CMAC-AES trivially outperforms both RSA and HMAC-SHA.
4. The average performance penalty rate for the SELECT query using CMAC-AES
is the lowest among the three algorithms with 18.2 in OCT and 43.97 in OCF.
The average penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 18.8 in OCT
and 48.96 in OCF. While for RSA, the average penalty rate is greatest with
27.33 in OCT and 74.78 in OCF.
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Figure 5.19: Using HMAC-SHA, plotted query process time in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT
* query from the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.19: Using HMAC-SHA, query process time raw data in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT
* query from the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 34.8
OCT 67.8 97.4 159.8 309.6886 634.6886 18.23817816
OCF 154.2 162.4 179.8 1203.5484 1699.9484 48.84909195
100k
DB 60.2 60.2
OCT 97.4 137.6 253.6 587.6222 1076.2222 17.87744518
OCF 155 298.2 379.6 1868.7006 2701.5006 44.87542525
150k
DB 79.2 79.2
OCT 136 217.4 365.6 873.9932 1592.9932 20.11355051
OCF 230.4 621 571.6 2729.4276 4152.4276 52.42964141
200k
DB 107.8 107.8
OCT 187.6 293.8 497.8 1088.207 2067.407 19.17817254
OCF 275.4 660 636.2 3783.4922 5355.0922 49.67617996
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Figure 5.20: Using CMAC-AES, plotted query process time in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT
* query from the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.20: Using CMAC-AES, query process time raw data in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT
* query from the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 34.8
OCT 57.4 140 126 300.005 623.405 17.91393678
OCF 85.8 242.4 161 880.5502 1369.7502 39.36063793
100k
DB 60.2 60.2
OCT 91.2 155 235 522.097 1003.297 16.66606312
OCF 171.8 354.8 367.2 1611.4814 2505.2814 41.6159701
150k
DB 79.2 79.2
OCT 130.6 204 412.4 830.6244 1577.6244 19.9195
OCF 231.6 620 496.2 2578.3812 3926.1812 49.57299495
200k
DB 107.8 107.8
OCT 214.4 225.8 530.6 1000.747 1971.547 18.28893321
OCF 266 695.4 628.4 3297.7274 4887.5274 45.33884416
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Figure 5.21: Using RSA, plotted query process time in AV mode in milliseconds for
different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.21: Using RSA, query process time raw data in AV mode in milliseconds
for different number of tuples returned (in thousands) by the SELECT * query from
the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 34.8 34.8
OCT 59.6 297.8 147.2 445.7996 950.3996 27.31033333
OCF 108.8 1010 373 880.0096 2371.8096 68.15544828
100k
DB 60.2 60.2
OCT 90.2 589.6 218.6 637.822 1536.222 25.51863787
OCF 224.8 2091.2 464.6 1572.2774 4352.8774 72.30693355
150k
DB 79.2 79.2
OCT 144.8 893.2 380 865.4458 2283.4458 28.83138636
OCF 248.8 3217.2 651.8 2399.6334 6517.4334 82.29082576
200k
DB 107.8 107.8
OCT 271.4 1139.8 493 1076.194 2980.394 27.6474397
OCF 435.8 4119.2 681.2 2995.6338 8231.8338 76.36209462
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As was shown when analyzing the ICDB Basic model, a different interpretation
can be done for the results in Figures 5.21, 5.20 and 5.19 (and Tables 5.21, 5.20 and
5.19). The process rate is derived based on the same Equation 5.3 used in ICDB
Basic model. However, the Total Processing Time in this case (AV mode in the DMV
model) includes IC fetch time, AIC generation time, data fetch time and also integrity
Verification time.
Figure 5.22 and Table 5.22 show the process rate for HMAC-SHA is 2.72 MB/sec in
OCT and 1.05 MB/sec in OCF. CMAC-AES has similar but slightly higher process
rates, with 2.83 MB/sec in OCT and 1.16 MB/sec in OCF. RSA takes longer to
process the user data with a process rate of 1.88 MB/sec in OCT and 0.69 MB/sec in
OCF. Similar to the ICDB Basic model, CMAC-AES has the highest (best) process
rate amongst the three different algorithms.
Compared to the ICDB Basic model, the process rates for both CMAC-AES and
HMAC-SHA are decreased (slower) than those in the Basic model (See Figure 5.6
and Table 5.6). This result is expected since in the AV mode of the DMV model,
there are more query process steps than the basic model has. However, the process
rate for the RSA algorithm in the DMV model, compared to the ICDB Basic model,
is improved significantly from 0.501 MB/sec to 1.88 MB/sec in OCT and from 0.134
MB/sec to 0.69 MB/sec in OCF. This result is also expected. Though there are more
query process steps in the DMV model, the verification step in the ICDB client does
not require the time-consuming recalculation of all the ICs before computing the AIC.
The ICDB client is able to compute the AIC from data directly due to the RSA’s
multiplication homomorphic property.
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Figure 5.22: A chart plotted the process rates for the AV mode in DMV model
showing the speed the user data (size in MB) can be processed by three different
algorithms in OCT and in OCF. The leftmost bar labeled DB is the process rate for
a standard SQL database.
Table 5.22: A table with process rate raw data for the AV mode in DMV model
showing the speed the user data (size in MB) can be processed by three different
algorithms in OCT and in OCF. The data in the row labeled DB is the process rate
for a standard SQL database.
DB 51.41
HMAC-SHA CMAC-AES RSA
OCT 2.72 2.83 1.88
OCF 1.05 1.16 0.69
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INSERT
To perform an INSERT query in AV mode of the DMV model, the same steps are
performed as in the INSERT query processing of the basic ICDB model described in
Section 5.4.1. Since each data along with its corresponding IC unit must be inserted
into the cloud database as in the basic model, the ICDB cloud application plays no
role in the INSERT query in the DMV model. Thus, the performance penalty for the
INSERT query in the DMV model is the same as that in the Basic model.
DELETE
In the AV mode of the DMV model, the ICDB DELETE query must fetch the data
to be deleted back to the ICDB client to ensure these data are valid and to record
the serial numbers in the local ICRL file. Thus, an ICDB DELETE query takes the
following steps:
ICDB DELETE query process steps in the AV mode of DMV model:
1. Query conversion: The ICDB client generates an SQL SELECT query from
the DELETE query and converts it into two ICDB SELECT queries Q1
and Q2 as described in Algorithms B and D in Chapter 4, and then issues
the queries Q1 and Q2 to the Cloud database server and the ICDB cloud
application, respectively.
2. SELECT queries Q1 and Q2 processing: The processes of Q1 and Q2 are
the same as the SELECT query process described earlier in the AV Mode
of the DMV model, which includes IC fetch, AIC generation, data fetch,
and verification.
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3. DELETE query execution: If all data fetched is verified, the ICDB client
will issue the DELETE query and the database server will execute the
DELETE.
4. ICRL update: Revoke the serial numbers in the ICRL after the DELETE
operation is done.
This section presents the performance penalty of the ICDB DELETE query, using a
DELETE query on the Employees.salaries table in the aggregate verification mode
of the DMV model described in section 3.2. The experimental results are shown in
three figures and three tables, one for each algorithm (HMAC-SHA, CMAC-AES, and
RSA). Each figure shows three data points a) DELETE query process time (only query
execution) for a standard database, b) The corresponding SELECT query process
time plus DELETE query execution time for an ICDB OCT counterpart, and c) The
corresponding SELECT query process time plus DELETE query execution time for
an ICDB OCF counterpart. From Figures 5.23, 5.24, 5.25 (and Tables 5.23, 5.24,
5.25 ), we have noted these implications:
1. The DELETE query execution takes more time than the corresponding ICDB
SELECT query process plus ICRL update in all six combinations of our exper-
iment because the DELETE query requires the database server to check the
referential integrity constraint for each data to be deleted.
2. Time taken to update the ICRL file after successful deletion is negligible,
compared to the total query process time.
3. For HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES, the result is similar to the basic model where
DELETE query execution time is comparatively larger than the corresponding
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ICDB SELECT query process time. However, the experimental result for RSA
is totally opposite to the result in the basic model. This is because the DELETE
query execution time is actually more than the corresponding ICDB SELECT
query process time (SELECT query process includes verification) in the AV
mode of the DMV model. This opposite result is because the homomorphic
property of RSA allows the ICDB client to generate the AIC directly without
having to regenerating all the ICs in the aggregate verification mode.
4. The average performance penalty rate for DELETE query using CMAC-AES is
1.29 in OCT and 1.7 in OCF. The average penalty rate for DELETE query using
HMAC-SHA is 1.29 in OCT and 1.8 in OCF. For RSA, the average penalty
rate is slightly higher with 1.43 in OCT and 2.13 in OCF, but is improved
significantly over the performance of the DELETE query in the basic model due
to the RSA homomorphic property and because there is no need to regenerate
all ICs.
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Figure 5.23: Using HMAC-SHA, plotted query process time in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE *
query from the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.23: Using HMAC-SHA, query process time raw data in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE *
query from the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Time ICRL Revoke Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 67.8 97.4 159.8 309.6886 38 2624 3296.6886 1.281063418
OCF 154.2 162.4 179.8 1203.5484 127.6 3022.4 4849.9484 1.884646149
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 97.4 137.6 253.6 587.6222 65 5194.2 6335.4222 1.318506181
OCF 155 298.2 379.6 1868.7006 264.4 5202 8167.9006 1.699875255
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 136 217.4 365.6 873.9932 72.4 7481.6 9146.9932 1.283968725
OCF 230.4 621 571.6 2729.4276 384.8 8298.6 12835.8276 1.801772544
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 187.6 293.8 497.8 1088.207 92.6 10040.2 12200.207 1.289962465
OCF 275.4 660 636.2 3783.4922 507.2 11256.2 17118.4922 1.809986699
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Figure 5.24: Using CMAC-AES, plotted query process time in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE *
query from the Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.24: Using CMAC-AES, query process time raw data in AV mode in
milliseconds for different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE *
query from the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Time ICRL Revoke Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 57.4 140 126 300.005 33.4 2794.6 3451.405 1.341184814
OCF 85.8 242.4 161 880.5502 133.6 2811.4 4314.7502 1.676672962
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 91.2 155 235 522.097 63 4971.2 6037.497 1.256503018
OCF 171.8 354.8 367.2 1611.4814 244.4 5193.4 7943.0814 1.65308666
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 130.6 204 412.4 830.6244 72.8 7421.6 9072.0244 1.273445312
OCF 231.6 750 496.2 2578.3812 408.6 8098.6 12563.3812 1.763529085
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 214.4 225.8 530.6 1000.747 92.4 9960.2 12024.147 1.271347142
OCF 266 695.4 628.4 3297.7274 511.2 10936.2 16334.9274 1.727138172
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Figure 5.25: Using RSA, plotted query process time in AV mode in milliseconds for
different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE * query from the
Employees.salaries table.
Table 5.25: Using RSA, query process time raw data in AV mode in milliseconds
for different number of tuples deleted (in thousands) by the DELETE * query from
the Employees.salaries table.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Time ICRL Revoke Execution Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 2573.4 2573.4
OCT 59.6 297.8 147.2 445.7996 37.4 3020.8 4008.5996 1.557705603
OCF 108.8 1010 373 880.0096 136.4 3018.2 5526.4096 2.147512862
100k
DB 4805 4805
OCT 90.2 589.6 218.6 637.822 65 5037.8 6639.022 1.381690323
OCF 224.8 2091.2 464.6 1572.2774 224.4 5600.2 10177.4774 2.118101436
150k
DB 7124 7124
OCT 144.8 893.2 380 865.4458 74.8 7821.6 10179.8458 1.428950842
OCF 248.8 3217.2 651.8 2399.6334 370.6 8298.6 15186.6334 2.131756513
200k
DB 9457.8 9457.8
OCT 271.4 1139.8 493 1076.194 93.6 9815 12888.994 1.362789867
OCF 435.8 4119.2 681.2 2995.6338 501.2 11336.2 20069.2338 2.121976971
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UPDATE
Similar to the Basic model, the UPDATE operation in the AV Mode of the DMV
model mirrors both DELETE and INSERT since it is functionally equivalent to first
DELETE a data item (or a set of data items) and then INSERT a new data item
(or a new set of data items). Hence, the experimental result for the UPDATE query
process can be analyzed from the DELETE and INSERT query process described
earlier.
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JOIN
To perform a JOIN query in the AV mode of DMV model requires the following steps:
ICDB JOIN query process steps in the AV mode of the DMV model:
1. Query Conversion: The ICDB client converts an SQL JOIN query into two
ICDB JOIN queries, Q1 and Q2 (See Algorithms B and D in Chapter 4)
and then issues the query Q1 to the cloud database server and the query
Q2 to ICDB cloud application.
2. Query Q2 processing has two major steps: IC fetch and AIC generation
in the ICDB cloud application. This process is the same as the Q2 process
in the SELECT query described earlier in the AV mode of DMV model.
3. Query Q1 processing has two major steps: Data fetch and Verification
in the ICDB client. Again, this process is the same as the Q1 process in the
SELECT query described earlier in the AV mode of DMV model.
To analyze a JOIN query in the AV mode of the DMV model, attributes from the
Employees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables were joined together.
The JOIN query used for the experiment was SELECT * FROM employees,
salaries where employees.emp no = salaries.emp no. Figures 5.26, 5.27, 5.28
and Tables 5.26, 5.27, 5.28 show the experimental results.
The time for AIC generation is greater than the IC fetch time in the cloud
application. For RSA, compared to HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES, the larger time
required for AIC generation is because RSA needs to perform modular multiplications
over large size ICs (1024 bits) to generate the AIC, whereas MAC algorithms just
need to combine the ICs (128 bits) and hash them to generate the AIC. Similarly,
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verification time required by the ICDB client is more than the data fetch time. For
RSA, compared to HMAC-SHA and CMAC-AES, verification time is less because
RSA does not need to regenerate all ICs but generates the AIC directly from the
data (because of the homomorphic property) for verification.
The average performance penalty rate for the JOIN query in the AV mode using
CMAC-AES is the lowest among all three algorithms with 15.53 in OCT and 45.2 in
OCF. The average penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 18.47 in OCT
and 53.18 in OCF. Both MAC algorithms in the AV mode have an increased average
penalty rate as compared to the basic model. However for RSA, the average penalty
rate is 24.97 in OCT and 81.17 in OCF, which is a huge improvement compared to the
basic model with the average penalty rate for RSA being 89.05 in OCT and 407.41
in OCF. Again, the reason for this improvement is because RSA’s homomorphic
property allows the ICDB client to generate the AIC directly from the data without
the need to regenerate all ICs in the aggregate verification mode.
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Figure 5.26: HMAC-SHA plotted query processing time for a query joining the
Employees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time re-
quired (in milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate
verification mode.
Table 5.26: HMAC-SHA plotted query processing time for a query joining the
Employees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time re-
quired (in milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate
verification mode.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 115.26 146.2 271.66 709.2726 1242.3926 19.11373231
OCF 262.14 439.8 305.66 2546.4152 3554.0152 54.67715692
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 253.6 273 431.12 1207.7948 2165.5148 17.46382903
OCF 379.6 712.8 645.32 4563.5096 6301.2296 50.81636774
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 231.2 391.2 621.52 1934.644 3178.564 17.9579887
OCF 391.68 1131.8 971.72 6836.1018 9331.3018 52.71921921
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 318.92 396 846.26 2791.6656 4352.8456 19.34598044
OCF 468.18 1313.4 1081.54 9402.1746 12265.2946 54.51242044
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Figure 5.27: CMAC-AES plotted query processing time for a query joining the
Employees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time re-
quired (in milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate
verification mode.
Table 5.27: CMAC-AES plotted query processing time for a query joining the
Employees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time re-
quired (in milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate
verification mode.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 97.58 87.9 214.2 533.7792 933.4592 14.36091077
OCF 145.86 353.7 273.7 2354.242 3127.502 48.11541538
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 155.04 237.9 399.5 1119.5232 1911.9632 15.41905806
OCF 292.06 449.8 624.24 3905.8574 5271.9574 42.51578548
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 222.02 194.8 701.08 1644.6508 2762.5508 15.60763164
OCF 393.72 740.9 843.54 6010.883 7989.043 45.13583616
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 364.48 245.7 902.02 2251.0052 3763.2052 16.72535644
OCF 452.2 763 1068.28 7846.443 10129.923 45.02188
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Figure 5.28: RSA plotted query processing time for a query joining the Em-
ployees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in
milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate verification
mode.
Table 5.28: RSA plotted query processing time for a query joining the Em-
ployees.employees and the Employees.salaries tables, showing the time required (in
milliseconds) for the number of tuples selected (in thousands) in aggregate verification
mode.
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 65 65
OCT 101.32 617.6 250.24 555.6094 1524.7694 23.45799077
OCF 184.96 2570.6 634.1 1959.844 5349.504 82.30006154
100k
DB 124 124
OCT 153.34 1092.4 371.62 1492.0876 3109.4476 25.07619032
OCF 382.16 4791.6 789.82 3594.0406 9557.6206 77.07758548
150k
DB 177 177
OCT 246.16 1624.4 646 1623.4768 4140.0368 23.39003842
OCF 422.96 7283.6 1108.06 5563.8386 14378.4586 81.23422938
200k
DB 225 225
OCT 461.38 2374.2 838.1 2613.0462 6286.7262 27.94100533
OCF 740.86 9816.2 1158.04 7198.6142 18913.7142 84.060952
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Functional Query
Similar to the ICDB basic model, to perform a functional query in the AV mode of
DMV model, all the data items used to evaluate the aggregate value must be fetched
and verified by the ICDB client. Thus, an ICDB functional query in the AV mode of
the DMV model will need to perform the following steps:
ICDB Functional query process steps in the AV mode of the DMV
model:
1. SELECT operation: The ICDB client will need to issue SELECT queries
Q1 and Q2, where the processing steps for Q1 include data fetch and
verification, whereas the processing steps for Q2 include IC fetch and
AIC generation. Check the detailed steps required for a SELECT query
in the AV mode of the DMV model described earlier.
2. Query execution in local: The ICDB client now is able to compute the
aggregate value over the fetched data. The aggregate function could be
SUM, MIN, MAX, AVG, or COUNT.
Figures 5.29, 5.30 and 5.31 and Tables 5.29, 5.30 and 5.31 show the experimental
results for the functional query in the AV mode for the DMV model. The functional
query used for this experiment includes four aggregate operations (SUM, MIN, MAX,
AVG) in a single Functional query. The data shows that the process time for a
functional query in the AV mode is similar to the corresponding SELECT query
(including Q1 and Q2) process time. The only additional time is the time for the
ICDB client to locally compute the aggregate values over the fetched and verified
data. This local computation is insignificant.
107
The average performance penalty rate for functional query using CMAC-AES in
the AV mode is the lowest among all three algorithms with 41.7 in OCT and 70.52 in
OCF. The average penalty rate is slightly higher for HMAC-SHA with 49.66 in OCT
and 81.95 in OCF. Both MAC algorithms have an increased performance penalty
rate in the AV mode compared to their penalty rate in the basic model. However for
RSA, the average penalty rate is 62.54 in OCT and 117.24 in OCF, which is a huge
improvement comparing to the basic model with the average penalty rate for RSA at
197.38 in OCT and 534.33 in OCF. Again, the reason for this improvement is because
RSA’s homomorphic property avoids the need to regenerate all ICs in the aggregate
verification mode.
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Figure 5.29: HMAC-SHA plotted query processing time against the number of
tuples returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Table 5.29: HMAC-SHA plotted query processing time against the number of tuples
returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 67.8 100.6 159.8 447.3312 775.5312 44.57075862
OCF 107.94 212 125.86 926.4222 1372.2222 78.86334483
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 97.4 126.2 253.6 1001.0922 1478.2922 49.11269767
OCF 108.5 236.6 265.72 1664.3822 2275.2022 75.58811296
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 136 224.2 365.6 1458.3362 2184.1362 55.15495455
OCF 161.28 306.2 400.12 2566.3172 3433.9172 86.71508081
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 187.6 256 497.8 1744.065 2685.465 49.82309833
OCF 192.78 555.4 445.34 3477.1536 4670.6736 86.65442672
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Figure 5.30: CMAC-AES plotted query processing time against the number of
tuples returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Table 5.30: CMAC-AES plotted query processing time against the number of tuples
returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 57.4 94.6 126 419.3074 697.3074 40.07513793
OCF 60.06 151.2 112.7 867.5308 1191.4908 68.47648276
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 91.2 148.2 235 763.8092 1238.2092 41.13651827
OCF 120.26 256.6 257.04 1517.8262 2151.7262 71.48592027
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 130.6 183.2 412.4 1058.107 1784.307 45.05825758
OCF 162.12 298 347.34 2046.9774 2854.4374 72.08175253
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 214.4 207.4 530.6 1232.6138 2185.0138 40.53828942
OCF 186.2 678.6 439.88 2470.9314 3775.6114 70.04844898
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Figure 5.31: RSA plotted query processing time against the number of tuples
returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Table 5.31: RSA plotted query processing time against the number of tuples
returned using a SELECT Query corresponding to the Functional Query
Time (ms)
No. of Tuples Scheme IC Fetch AIC generation Data Fetch Verification Total Query Process Performance Penalty Rate
50k
DB 17.4 17.4
OCT 59.6 273.8 147.2 424.8366 905.4366 52.03658621
OCF 76.16 842.4 261.1 698.252 1877.912 107.925977
100k
DB 30.1 30.1
OCT 90.2 560.8 218.6 957.5804 1827.1804 60.70366777
OCF 157.36 1549.2 325.22 1271.4308 3303.2108 109.7412226
150k
DB 39.6 39.6
OCT 144.8 916.8 380 1313.3244 2754.9244 69.56879798
OCF 174.16 2480.6 456.26 2202.7696 5313.7896 134.1866061
200k
DB 53.9 53.9
OCT 271.4 1248.6 493 1643.716 3656.716 67.8425974
OCF 305.06 3072.4 476.84 2458.4448 6312.7448 117.1195696
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Summary
Tables 5.32 and 5.33 list the memory penalty rates and the average performance
penalty rates for all of the experiments in both the ICDB basic and the DMV models.
We also summarize our experiments for all twelve different combinations of ICDB
schemes based on their memory penalty and performance penalty.
Table 5.32: Memory penalty rates for all experiments in both the ICDB basic and
the DMV models
Basic model DMV model
Database Scheme SHA AES RSA SHA- AV mode AES- AV mode RSA-AV mode
Employees
OCT 1.53 1.53 3.88 1.53 1.53 3.88
OCF 3.15 3.15 13.07 3.15 3.15 13.07
Table 5.33: Average performance penalty rates for all experiments in both ICDB
basic and DMV models
Basic model DMV model
Query Scheme SHA AES RSA SHA- AV mode AES- AV mode RSA-AV mode
Select
OCT 13.29 11.07 104.81 18.85 18.2 27.33
OCF 31.39 25.24 389.21 48.96 43.97 74.78
Insert
OCT 2.69 2.68 6.62 2.69 2.68 6.62
OCF 5.14 4.94 21.01 5.14 4.94 21.01
Delete
OCT 1.25 1.25 2.39 1.29 1.29 1.43
OCF 1.62 1.53 5.75 1.8 1.7 2.13
Functional
OCT 36.05 30.09 197.38 49.66 41.7 62.54
OCF 53.46 47.82 534.33 81.95 70.52 117.24
Join
OCT 13.56 12.18 89.05 18.47 15.53 24.97
OCF 36.36 31.73 407.41 53.18 45.2 81.17
OCT vs. OCF.
1. In all cases, OCT has a lower memory penalty and performance penalty than
OCF does.
2. However, a very important advantage OCF maintains over OCT is that OCF
is able to detect whether a particular field entry/data is corrupted, while OCT
is only able to detect whether a tuple is corrupted.
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3. Though OCT costs less memory and has less performance penalty, all queries
need to fetch entire tuples even if the query only requests values from a sin-
gle column. There is an opportunity for further research work to investigate
reducing the volume of additional information related to the data, using the
Authenticated Data Structures (ADS) such as the Merkel Hash Trees described
in [5]. In such structures, instead of fetching the entire tuple, one need only fetch
the requested data and the hash value of the data required to compute the root
of the Hash Tree. In order to support this operation, though, the ICDB client
has to compute multiple hashes before uploading the data. Also, the cloud
database server itself has to compute multiple hashes or store precomputed
hashes of each leaf or internal node. The change in the database structure and
query processing will make the ICDB no longer transparent to the cloud servers
and thus we did not adopt the ADS structure in this research. Nonetheless,
This may still be considered for future research.
HMAC-SHA vs. CMAC-AES vs. RSA.
1. The large (1024 bits) ICs for RSA incur more memory penalty than the MAC
algorithms with 128-bit ICs.
2. CMAC-AES has a slightly lower performance penalty rate than HMAC-SHA in
all experiments.
3. Among the three cryptographic algorithms, in the basic model, RSA has the
maximum performance penalty rate. IN OCT, RSA’s performance penalty rate
is about 2 (INSERT operation) to 10 (SELECT operation) times more than the
penalty rates of MAC algorithms. IN OCF, RSA’s performance penalty rate is
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about 4 (INSERT operation) to 15 (SELECT operation) times more than the
penalty rates of MAC algorithms.
Similarly, in the AV mode of DMV model, RSA again has the highest perfor-
mance penalty rate. IN OCT, RSA’s performance penalty rate is about 1.1
(DELETE operation) to 1.5 (SELECT operation) times more than the penalty
rates of MAC algorithms. IN OCF, RSA’s performance penalty rate is about 1.2
(DELETE operation) to 1.7 (SELECT operation) times more than the penalty
rates of MAC algorithms.
We can see that in the AV mode, RSA still performs worse than MAC algorithms
but it gets much closer to the performance of MAC algorithms. The reason
for this is because the RSA’s homomorphic property allows the ICDB client to
generate the AIC directly without having to regenerate all ICs in the verification
process in the AV mode.
SELECT vs. INSERT vs. DELETE vs. JOIN vs. Functional
1. Among all query types, based on our experiments in the basic model, the ranking
of incurred performance penalty, from the least to the greatest, is DELETE <
INSERT << SELECT ≈ JOIN < Functional, where the symbol << means a
notable (significant) increase.
2. Similarly for the AV mode of the DMV model, the ranking of the performance
penalty is the same, i.e., DELETE < INSERT << SELECT ≈ JOIN < Func-
tional.
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Basic Model vs. DMV Model.
1. Introducing the AV mode of the DMV model on top of the basic ICDB model
has reduced the network overhead since the ICDB client need no longer fetch
ICs along with the data from the database servers through the network.
2. Since the cloud database server has to store all the ICs and serials in both
models, the memory penalty for both models is the same.
3. For the DMV model when compared to the basic model, though MAC algo-
rithms did not improve (actually worse) their performance, there was a huge
performance improvement for the RSA algorithm. We see that RSA did not
fare very well in the basic model. It has comparatively large integrity code
size, and takes a much longer time to verify than HMAC-SHA or CMAC-AES
does. However, in the aggregate verification (of the DMV model), the results
are comparable to CMAC-AES and HMAC-SHA.
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Ranking all the ICDB Schemes: We have suggested a ranking for all the ICDB
schemes from our experimental results based on the incurred memory penalty and
performance penalty. Table 5.35 provides a quick view of the rankings for all the
schemes.
1. The ranking is based on a scale of Low to High as shown in the table 5.34. A
’High’ ranking in the scale refers to the worst result (highest penalty rate) and
a ’Low’ ranking refers to the best result (least penalty rate) in our experiment.
2. Basic-OCF-RSA has High rankings in both metrics and thus is the worst,
whereas DVM(AV Mode)-OCT-HMAC and DVM(AV Mode)-OCT-CMAC have
low rankings in both metrics and thus are the best. On the other hand, OCF-
RSA schemes have better functionality which allow finer integrity protection
granularity to the level of each field entry and the allow the cloud database
server to perform the homomorphic operation (homomorphic multiplication of
numeric data) on behalf of the data owner.
3. The performance penalty for RSA is reduced significantly in the AV mode of the
DMV model compared to the basic model due to the homomorphic property of
RSA.
4. Another major advantage of the AV mode of the DMV model compared to the
basic model is the reduction of network overhead by transmitting a single AIC
instead of many individual ICs over the network.
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Table 5.34: Ranking Scale
Scale
Low(1)
Moderate Low (2)
Intermediate(3)
Moderate High(4)
High(5)
Table 5.35: Ranking of different ICDB schemes in either Basic or DMV model
MODELS Granularity Algorithms Memory Penalty Performance Penalty
Basic model
OCF
HMAC-SHA Moderate Low (2) Moderate Low (2)
CMAC-AES Moderate Low (2) Moderate Low (2)
RSA High(5) High(5)
OCT
HMAC-SHA Low(1) Low(1)
CMAC-AES Low(1) Low(1)
RSA Intermediate(3) Moderate High(4)
DMV model (AV Mode)
OCF
HMAC-SHA Moderate Low (2) Moderate Low (2)
CMAC-AES Moderate Low (2) Moderate Low (2)
RSA High(5) Intermediate(3)
OCT
HMAC-SHA Low(1) Low(1)
CMAC-AES Low(1) Low(1)
RSA Intermediate(3) Moderate Low (2)
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we proposed an ICDB approach to protect data integrity for outsourced
databases in the cloud. The approach inserts a cryptographically generated integrity
code for each data item to be protected. The way we construct the integrity code
ensures that nobody except the data owner is able to modify the data and at the mean
time generates a matching integrity code for it. Using such an integrity code, any
forged data can be detected. In addition, our ICDB approach assigns a unique serial
number to each integrity code and proposes a scheme similar to the X.509 standard
to ensure the freshness of outsourced data, where the X.509 standard is a scheme to
manage all unexpired public key certificates.
We have implemented an ICDB working prototype which was used to conduct
empirical experiments to evaluate the memory and performance penalty for each
ICDB scheme. We have shown all the experimental results and analyzed their indi-
cations/implications in Chapter 5.
In addition to empirical experiments, we also investigated the pricing schemes
of existing database service providers so that we are able to suggest which ICDB
scheme(s) may be the best choice economically for each pricing scheme in the real
world service providers.
Cloud Services Schemes: Different Cloud Service Providers have their own
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pricing schemes. Reviewing the pricing schemes of three major cloud providers with
the highest market share, Amazon Web Services (AWS) [27], Google Cloud Platform
[29] and Microsoft Azure [28] has helped us to relate our work to the real cloud
environment. Cloud Relational Database Services (RDS) charge customers based on
the storage, data inflow/outflow and number of instances. Some cloud providers
such as Microsoft Azure offer a scheme in package (with a fixed rate of charge)
with maximum database instances per pool, maximum storage per pool, maximum
transaction per pool for an elastic pool of databases. Google cloud offers free inbound
data but charges for all outbound data. Similarly, Amazon Web Services (AWS) has
its own scheme for RDS pricing. It charges per hour of the instance used and GB
per month of storage. As with Google cloud, AWS too is free for inbound data and
charges per GB of outbound data.
ICDB Scheme choices based on Cloud Services Schemes: If the database
size and the number of transactions for the database will never exceed the maximum
limit offered by the cloud service package, then all ICDB schemes can be considered.
In this case, if the database application requires integrity protection level down to
each data field, then OCF schemes will be the choice. Furthermore, if the database
application requires the database server to perform homomorphic operations on behalf
of the data owner, then the ICDB schemes using the RSA algorithm will be the choice.
For cloud services that charge only for outbound data, the ICDB schemes in the
AV mode of DMV model is the best choice since the outbound data is almost the
same as a standard SQL database with just additional data for serial numbers. This
will keep the cost similar to standard SQL databases.
If the database size and amount of inflow/outflow data (which directly impact
on the database size) are unpredictable, then the choice of service should be the one
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with an on-demand pricing scheme that charges based on the usage. CMAC-AES in
OCT has the minimum performance penalty and only increases the database size by
approximately 1.53 times, compared to the standard database. Thus, CMAC-OCT
should be the best choice in this case.
Table 5.35 listing all 12 ICDB schemes with their performance and memory
rankings should provide useful information for users to decide which ICDB scheme
and which database service provider can benefit them the most.
Future Work
1. Although the experimental results presented in this thesis provide an adequate
level of understanding of the ICDB performance, they are not exhaustive.
Additional tests could be conducted separately. For instance, the benchmarks
provided have only been tested on the Employees [21] sample database, which
is approximately 196.4 MB in size. More databases with larger sizes can be
tested to gain a better understanding of performance.
2. The experiment could be performed on the real cloud DB service provider and
cloud application to study the performance in a real cloud environment.
3. The implementation provided is configured to only communicate with a MySQL
database, but other database options can be tested (e.g., PostgreSQL, SQLite).
4. We have only used a SELECT * query for our experiments. There are notable
performance differences between OCT and OCF, namely that OCF does not
necessarily need to return entire tuples when queried but in this case (SELECT
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*) it has to. Thus, experiments based on a different SELECT query could
reduce the performance gap between OCT and OCF.
5. All the experimental results provided in this thesis are based on the integrity
verification of returned query results. Incomplete query results cannot be
detected with the current ICDB models. Thus, future research is necessary
to assure the completeness of queried data returned from the cloud database
server.
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-- Sample employee database
See changelog table for details
Copyright (C) 2007,2008, MySQL AB
Original data created by Fusheng Wang and Carlo Zaniolo
http://www.cs.aau.dk/TimeCenter/software.htm
http://www.cs.aau.dk/TimeCenter/Data/employeeTemporalDataSet.zip
Current schema by Giuseppe Maxia
Data conversion from XML to relational by Patrick Crews
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License.
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ or send a letter to
Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco,
California, 94105, USA.
DISCLAIMER
To the best of our knowledge, this data is fabricated, and
it does not correspond to real people.
Any similarity to existing people is purely coincidental.
CREATE TABLE employees (
emp no INT NOT NULL,
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birth date DATE NOT NULL,
first name VARCHAR(14) NOT NULL,
last name VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
gender ENUM (’M’,’F’) NOT NULL,
hire date DATE NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (emp no)
);
CREATE TABLE departments (
dept no CHAR(4) NOT NULL,
dept name VARCHAR(40) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (dept no),
UNIQUE KEY (dept name)
);
CREATE TABLE dept manager (
emp no INT NOT NULL,
dept no CHAR(4) NOT NULL,
from date DATE NOT NULL,
to date DATE NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (emp no) REFERENCES employees (emp no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (dept no) REFERENCES departments (dept no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (emp no,dept no)
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);
CREATE TABLE dept emp (
emp no INT NOT NULL,
dept no CHAR(4) NOT NULL,
from date DATE NOT NULL,
to date DATE NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (emp no) REFERENCES employees (emp no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
FOREIGN KEY (dept no) REFERENCES departments (dept no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (emp no,dept no)
);
CREATE TABLE titles (
emp no INT NOT NULL,
title VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,
from date DATE NOT NULL,
to date DATE,
FOREIGN KEY (emp no) REFERENCES employees (emp no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (emp no,title, from date)
);
CREATE TABLE salaries (
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emp no INT NOT NULL,
salary INT NOT NULL,
from date DATE NOT NULL,
to date DATE NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (emp no) REFERENCES employees (emp no)
ON DELETE CASCADE,
PRIMARY KEY (emp no, from date)
);
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APPENDIX B
HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS
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We performed all the testing for ICDB on Onyx server. Onyx is a Boise State
University’s multiuser Linux server for students and faculty. Multi-user Linux com-
puters may be accessed concurrently by more then one user. The remote connection
will require two components on the computer, an X11 server and an SSH client. The
server is accessible through onyx.boisestate.edu. The hardware specifications are as
follows:
Architecture: x86 64
CPU op-mode(s): 32-bit, 64-bit
Byte Order: Little Endian
CPU(s): 32
On-line CPU(s) list: 0-31
Thread(s) per core: 2
Core(s) per socket: 8
Socket(s): 2
NUMA node(s): 2
Vendor ID: GenuineIntel
CPU family: 6
Model: 63
Model name: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2640
v3 @ 2.60GHz
Stepping: 2
CPU MHz: 1401.664
BogoMIPS: 5203.83
Virtualization: VT-x
L1d cache: 32K
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L1i cache: 32K
L2 cache: 256K
L3 cache: 20480K
NUMA node0 CPU(s): 0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22,24,26,28,30
NUMA node1 CPU(s): 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15,17,19,21,23,25,27,29,31
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APPENDIX C
DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT:
133
Language: Java, Kotlin, JDBC for database connectivity
Database: MySQL
IDE: IntelliJ IDEA
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APPENDIX D
ICDB COMMANDS
135
D.1 Initial Setup
To be able to build and run against a database, the following must be installed:
Maven
MySQL
Then run the following commands to build the project:
1. git clone https://github.com/ujjwalkarki/ICDB-CloudApp.git
2. cd IntegrityCodedDatabase/ICDB
3. make
D.2 Running the ICDB tool
The arguments for interacting with the ICDB tool is as follows:
icdb [-c config-file] [command] [options]
icdb is a bash script that simply runs the compiled jar. This can be run directly:
java -jar target/icdb-capsule.jar [-c config-file] [command] [options]
All interactions with the tool will require a config file containing a JSON object
with several parameters listed below:
ip - the target MySQL database IP address
port - the port the database is running on
user - database user
password - database password (if any)
schema - database schema to use (for conversion)
icdbSchema - ICDB database schema name (for execution and verification)
algorithm - the encryption algorithm to use (RSA, AES, SHA, RSA AGGREGATE,
AES AGGREGATE and SHA AGGREGATE)
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granularity - use code per field or code per tuple (FIELD or TUPLE)
macKey - 128-bit MAC key encoded as a base64 string
rsaKeyFile - PEM file containing public and private RSA keys
For convenience, a config file is given at ./ICDB/config.json, which will be loaded
by default if the -c option is not specified.
The default config provides the following JSON object:
”ip”: ”localhost”,
”port”: 10154,
”user”: ”msandbox”,
”password”: ”msandbox”,
”schema”: ”employees”,
”icdbSchema”: ”employees icdb”,
”algorithm”: ”SHA”,
”granularity”: ”TUPLE”,
”macKey”: ”qyPTqFrPGUpxcIo9sz2MdQ==”,
”rsaKeyFile”: ”key.pem”
D.3 Commands Available
1. convert-db - Converts an existing DB to an ICDB (both schema and data)
2. convert-query - Converts a DB query to an ICDB query
3. execute-query - Executes an ICDB query and verifies all returned data
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D.3.1 Convert DB Command
The convert-db command has 4 phases, any of which can be skipped: –skip-duplicate,
if set, the duplicate DB step will be skipped –skip-schema, if set, the schema conver-
sion step will be skipped –skip-data, if set, the data conversion step will be skipped
–skip-load, if set, the data load step will be skipped. The command is:
convert-db [–skip-duplicate] [–skip-schema] [–skip-data] [–skip-load]
Example:
cd project-root/ICDB
icdb convert-db
D.3.2 Convert Query Command
The convert-query command takes the SQL query as an input and converts it to an
ICDB query. The conversion requires: -q ”The SQL query, passed in as a string”.
The command is:
convert-query [-q query]
Example:
cd project-root/ICDB icdb convert-query -q ”SELECT * FROM employees;”
D.3.3 Execute Query Command
The convert-data command takes a SQL query as input, executes, then verifies any
returned data. -q ”The SQL query, passed in as a string” THe command is:
execute-query [-q query]
Example:
cd project-root/ICDB icdb execute-query -q ”SELECT * FROM employees;”
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APPENDIX E
QUERY CONVERSION:
139
We used different mySQL queries to convert it to the ICDB queries which are
listed below:
E.1 MySQL Select Queries:
1. SELECT * FROM departments;
2. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date FROM
employees WHERE gender=’M’;
3. SELECT dept no, from date, to date FROM dept emp;
4. SELECT emp no FROM salaries WHERE salary>60000;
5. SELECT * FROM titles;
6. SELECT departments.dept no,departments.dept name, dept manager.emp no,
dept manager.from date,dept manager.to date FROM departments INNER JOIN
dept manager ON departments.dept no=dept manager.dept no;
E.1.1 ICDB Select Queries(OCF):
1. SELECT dept no, dept name,dept no ic,dept no serial, dept name ic, dept name serial
FROM departments;
2. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date,emp no ic,
emp no serial, birth date ic, birth date serial, first name ic, first name serial,
last name ic, last name serial, gender ic, gender serial, hire date ic, hire date serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’;
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3. SELECT dept no, from date, to date,emp no,dept no ic,dept no serial, from date ic,
from date serial, to date ic, to date serial,emp no ic,emp no serial FROM dept emp;
4. SELECT emp no, salary,from date,emp no ic,emp no serial, salary ic, salary serial,
from date ic,from date serial FROM salaries WHERE salary > 60000;
5. SELECT from date,title,emp no, to date,from date ic,from date serial,title ic,title serial,
emp no ic,emp no serial, to date ic, to date serial FROM titles;
6. SELECT departments.dept no, departments.dept name, dept manager.emp no,
dept manager.from date, dept manager.to date, departments.dept no, dept manager.emp no,
dept manager.dept no, departments.dept no ic, departments.dept no serial, de-
partments.dept name ic, departments.dept name serial, dept manager.emp no ic,
dept manager.emp no serial, dept manager.from date ic, dept manager.from date serial,
dept manager.to date ic, dept manager.to date serial, departments.dept no ic,
departments.dept no serial, dept manager.emp no ic, dept manager.emp no serial,
dept manager.dept no ic, dept manager.dept no serial FROM departments IN-
NER JOIN dept manager ON departments.dept no = dept manager.dept no;
E.1.2 ICDB Select Queries(OCT):
1. SELECT dept no, dept name, ic, serial FROM departments;
2. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date, ic, serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’;
3. SELECT emp no, dept no, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM dept emp;
4. SELECT emp no, salary, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM salaries WHERE
salary > 60000;
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5. SELECT emp no, title, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM titles;
6. SELECT departments.dept no, departments.dept name, departments.ic, depart-
ments.serial, dept manager.emp no, dept manager.dept no, dept manager.from date,
dept manager.to date, dept manager.ic, dept manager.serial FROM departments
INNER JOIN dept manager ON departments.dept no = dept manager.dept no;
INSERT query conversion is not included in the appendix due to the large IC
values in ICDB Query for each of the inserting attributes or tuples.
E.2 MySQL DELETE Queries
1. DELETE FROM departments WHERE dept no=’d006’;
2. DELETE FROM salaries WHERE salary>60000 AND salary<65000;
3. DELETE FROM employees WHERE gender=’M’;
4. DELETE FROM titles;
5. DELETE FROM employees WHERE gender=’M’ AND last name=’Terkki’;
6. DELETE FROM titles WHERE title!=’Staff’;
E.2.1 ICDB Delete Verification Queries (OCF):
1. SELECT dept no, dept name, dept no ic, dept no serial, dept name ic, dept name serial
FROM departments WHERE dept no = ’d006’;
2. SELECT emp no, salary, from date, to date, emp no ic, emp no serial, salary ic,
salary serial, from date ic, from date serial, to date ic, to date serial FROM
salaries WHERE salary > 60000 AND salary < 65000;
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3. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date, emp no ic,
emp no serial, birth date ic, birth date serial, first name ic, first name serial,
last name ic, last name serial, gender ic, gender serial, hire date ic, hire date serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’;
4. SELECT emp no, title, from date, to date, emp no ic, emp no serial, title ic,
title serial, from date ic, from date serial, to date ic, to date serial FROM ti-
tles;
5. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date, emp no ic,
emp no serial, birth date ic, birth date serial, first name ic, first name serial,
last name ic, last name serial, gender ic, gender serial, hire date ic, hire date serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’ AND last name = ’Terkki’;
6. SELECT emp no, title, from date, to date, emp no ic, emp no serial, title ic,
title serial, from date ic, from date serial, to date ic, to date serial FROM ti-
tles WHERE title != ’Staff’;
E.2.2 ICDB Delete Verification Queries (OCT):
1. SELECT dept no, dept name, ic, serial FROM departments WHERE dept no
= ’d006’;
2. SELECT emp no, salary, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM salaries WHERE
salary > 60000 AND salary < 65000;
3. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date, ic, serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’;
4. SELECT emp no, title, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM titles;
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5. SELECT emp no, birth date, first name, last name, gender, hire date, ic, serial
FROM employees WHERE gender = ’M’ AND last name = ’Terkki’;
6. SELECT emp no, title, from date, to date, ic, serial FROM titles WHERE title
!= ’Staff’;
E.3 MySQL Functional Query:
1. Select sum(salary) from salaries;
E.3.1 ICDB Functional Query(OCF):
1. Select salary, salary ic, salary serial, emp no, emp no ic, emp no serial, from date,
from date ic, from date serial from salaries;
E.3.2 ICDB Functional Query(OCT):
1. Select * from salaries;
